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Abstract

In this paper we argue the case for greater exploitation of synergies between research on specific
institutions based on micro-data and the big questions posed by the institutions and growth literature.
To date, the macroeconomic literature on institutions and growth has largely relied on cross-country
regression evidence. This has provided compelling evidence for a causal link between a cluster of
‘good’ institutions and more rapid long run growth. However, an inability to disentangle the effects
of specific institutional channels on growth or to understand the impact of institutional change on
growth will limit further progress using a cross-country empirical strategy. We suggest two research
programs based on micro-data that have significant potential. The first uses policy-induced variation
in specific institutions within countries to understand how these institutions influence economic
activity. The second exploits the fact that the incentives provided by a given institutional context
often vary with individuals’ economic and political status. This can help us better understand how
institutional change arises in response to changing economic and demographic pressures.
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Abstract
In this paper we argue the case for greater exploitation of synergies between research on
specific institutions based on micro-data and the big questions posed by the institutions and
growth literature. To date, the macroeconomic literature on institutions and growth has
largely relied on cross-country regression evidence. This has provided compelling evidence
for a causal link between a cluster of ‘good’ institutions and more rapid long run growth.
However, an inability to disentangle the effects of specific institutional channels on growth or
to understand the impact of institutional change on growth will limit further progress using
a cross-country empirical strategy. We suggest two research programs based on micro-data
that have significant potential. The first uses policy-induced variation in specific institutions
within countries to understand how these institutions influence economic activity. The second
exploits the fact that the incentives provided by a given institutional context often vary
with individuals’ economic and political status. This can help us better understand how
institutional change arises in response to changing economic and demographic pressures.

1

Introduction

Recent years have seen a remarkable and exciting revival of interest in the empirical analysis of
how a broad set of institutions affects growth. The focus of the recent outpouring of research
∗
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grateful to our discussant Orazio Attanasio for comments. Finally, we thank James Fenske and Pinar Keskin for
fantastic research assistance.
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is on exploiting cross-country variation in ‘institutional quality’ to identify whether a causal
effect runs from institutions to growth. These papers conclude that institutional quality is a
significant determinant of a country’s growth performance.
These findings are of fundamental importance for development economists and policy practitioners in that they suggest that institutional quality may cause poor countries and people
to stay poor. However, the economic interpretation and policy implications of these findings
depends on understanding the specific channels through which institutions affect growth, and
the reasons for institutional change or the lack thereof. However, for reasons discussed below, we
argue that the coarseness of cross-country data limits its usefulness for such research. Instead,
we suggest that a more fruitful research agenda is to exploit the synergies between research
based on micro-data and the questions posed by the institutions and growth literature.
North (1981) defines an economic institution as “a set of rules, compliance procedures and
moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the
interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.” (p.201-202). We adopt his definition
of institutions as sets of rules, procedures or norms that constrain behavior but disagree with
the notion of agency embodied in this definition. Institutions need not be ‘designed’, and even
if they are, their actual operation may be quite different than intended. For this reason, we
emphasize a research agenda on institutions which pays attention to de facto rather than de
jure institutions and one that pays attention to how changes in resource endowments can cause
individuals to change their economic behavior within a given institutional context and potentially
cause the institution itself to change in the longer run. Such a focus is particularly relevant when
thinking about institutions in low income countries – since development, by definition, is about
change.
In section 2 we summarize the main insights from the cross-country literature on institutions
and growth. This literature has successfully focussed attention on the complex interactions between economic growth and institutional development. It has uncovered important correlations
across countries between growth and the nature and quality of a core set of economic, political and social institutions. This literature has also been careful in noting, and accounting for,
the fact that institutions and economic growth jointly cause each other. A positive correlation
between ‘good’ institutions and growth may reflect reverse causation; faster growing countries
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may have ‘better’ institutions because they can afford them. Faced with the statistical challenge
of isolating causal pathways, authors have been extraordinarily inventive in identifying features
of countries that are plausibly exogenous to the growth process, but that might influence the
character of institutional development and thus might serve as instrumental variables. However,
we argue that this literature has served its purpose and is essentially complete. The number
of variables available as instrumental variables is limited, and their coarseness prevents close
analysis of particular causal mechanisms from institutions to growth. Further, the fact that
instruments tend to be derived from persistent features of a country’s institutional environment
such as its colonial past limits their usefulness for studying institutional change.
This suggests that the research agenda identified by the institutions and growth literature is
best furthered by the analysis of much more micro-data than has typically been the norm in this
literature. In section 3 we describe how policy-induced variation in institutional form within a
country can be exploited to examine how specific institutions influence economic outcomes. An
important advantage of such studies is that information about how such change was implemented
across regions in the country and/or differences in the regional incidence of the policy can very
often be exploited to obtain instruments for specific institutions.
Finally, in section 4 we discuss a different but complimentary research focus – close examinations of the economic choices of individuals in a specific institutional context. A given
institutional setting can provide a rich variety of incentives to different individuals, depending
upon their economic and political standing. Further, one can potentially also examine institutional change in response to changing factor endowments. We illustrate this research agenda
with an example from Ghana, in which we analyze the effects of a complex land tenure system
on investment incentives, and provide some evidence regarding the historical evolution of that
institution and some indications of how changes in economic environment may cause individuals
to take actions that have the potential to transform the institutional environment.

2

Cross-Country Analysis

In this section we summarize the important recent contributions to the empirical institutions
and growth literature, and then discuss reasons why we believe this literature to be essentially
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complete. In Table 1 we list five widely cited papers in this literature, which we term ‘Core
Papers’. These are the papers which were the first to use (and often develop) influential institutional quality measures or instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of institutional
measures. We then describe ‘papers citing core papers’. These are articles which cite at least
one core paper, and are published or forthcoming (that we could identify) in the following journals: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Development Economics, Journal
of Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy and Review
of Economic Studies. We restrict attention to papers with at least one cross-country regression
which consider a measure of the country’s growth performance (or well-being of the population) as the outcome variable of interest and include a measure of institutional quality as an
explanatory variable.1
For each paper, Table 1 describes the outcome variable of interest, the institutional measure,
the instrumental variables used and the paper’s main finding. Typically, we report the estimates
for the most basic specification in the paper.

2.1

Observations

The resurgence of the cross-country literature on institutions and growth is clearly linked to
two factors. The first is the availability of comparable measures of institutional quality for a
large set of countries, and second there is the use of instrumental variable techniques to deal
with the endogeneity of institutions. This is a rich and active literature with much debate
about the suitability of empirical strategies adopted by the different papers, the validity of
their identification assumptions and the relative magnitudes of the effects of different kinds of
institutions on growth outcomes. From Table 1 we pull together some observations about this
literature.
A. Institutions Matter
Almost without exception, the papers listed in Table 1 find a robust positive correlation between
growth outcomes and an array of measures of institutional quality. Looking across countries,
1

Our focus implies we exclude an important companion literature which examines how institutional quality

affects policy outcomes, such as the size of government.
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the literature argues that improvements in the quality of contracting institutions, better law
enforcement, increased protection of private property rights, improvements in central government bureaucracy, improved operation of formal sector financial markets, increased levels of
democracy, and higher levels of trust are all correlated with higher economic growth.
B. Comparable institution measures are coarse and urban-based
The main focus in this literature has been on using aggregate measures of institutional quality,
and one of the strengths of this literature is the broad range of such measures that it examines.
Many of the papers rely on indicators generated by organizations whose primary purpose is
to provide assessments of the various forms of political risk or of the contractual environment
in countries around the world.

These sources (for example, Political Risk Services, Business

Environmental Risk Intelligence, or the Economist Intelligence Unit) have the important advantage of being expressly designed to be comparable across countries. For example, a ‘protection
against expropriation’ score of 7 from Political Risk Services is supposed to mean the same thing
in any country of the world. Most of these measures relate to institutional quality as faced by
businesses and individuals in the more formal urban sector. It is also the case that this literature, almost by definition, has to treat ‘institutions’ coarsely. The fundamental problem is that
the dimension of the vector of institutions that we believe influences growth is extremely large.
Because some dimensions are unobserved (by nature, or because of data problems) and because
the number of countries is small, regressions never include this whole vector of institutions on
the right hand side.
C. Instruments are rare
There is widespread recognition of the fact that institutional form may be determined by economic performance. In Table 1 we see that a very small number of variables have been called
upon to identify the causal effects of the wide range of institutions examined in the literature.
The key instrumental variables have been based on geography (distance from equator and predicted trade share, oil exporter) and colonial and pre-ccolonial history (settler mortality, legal
origin, ethnic and linguistic composition, precolonial population density, state antiquity). The
paucity of plausible instruments arises from the fact that there are few variables that are im5

portant determinants of the current form of a particular economic institution but affect growth
only through that institution.
Another striking feature is that the same variable is often used in different studies as an
instrument for different indices of institutions, and interpreted in varying ways. Consider settler
mortality. It is used to instrument for: (i) protection against expropriation risk; (ii) executive
constraints; (iii) measures of financial depth such as private credit; (iv) a rule of law index; and
(v) the overall index of institutional quality.2
D. Persistent Institutional Effects
The instruments that dominate the literature are based on geography and colonial and precolonial history. These variables exploit long term persistent institutional features of a country.
The IV strategy purges the estimates of the effect of any institutions that change along the path
of development, because these are clearly endogenous to the growth process.

This, however,

implies that the IV strategy by design is not able to identify the consequences of institutional
change for growth.
E. IV estimates typically exceed OLS estimates
IV estimates of the institutions growth relationship are always significantly larger than the OLS
estimates. Given that endogeneity concerns would suggest an upward bias in the OLS estimate,
a common interpretation is attenuation bias in the OLS due to measurement error.

2.2

The Limits of Cross-Country Analysis

Based on these observations we now suggest that the general approach of this literature may not
be compatible with further progress on exploring the channels through which institutions affect
economic development, or on understanding how institutional change can affect growth. Some
of our arguments, especially the problems with using measures based on a country’s colonial
2

Another remarkable fact is that almost all the variables that serve as instruments were introduced in one

of the five core papers as instruments or institutions.

Only state antiquity, the oil exporter dummy and the

proportion of postsecondary law students in 1963 have been introduced in the 16 papers that follow. This is a
further indication of the difficulty of finding suitable instruments for endogenous institutions.
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past to instrument for specific institutions, have already received attention in the institutions
and growth literature; for a very complimentary analysis see Acemoglu (2005).

A. Coarseness of institutional measures and instruments
The cross country literature has largely relied on broad indices of institutional quality. A first
concern is that the construction of these indices requires subjective valuations of what belongs
in the index. Typically, the information that underlies the indices is not fully public, and
reflects the subjective judgements of analysts at the risk assessment organization. For example
Political Risk Services (PRS) constructs the widely-used ICRG measures. The ICRG provides
a number of indicators, most of which rely on a combination of objective information about the
country and subjective assessments of PRS analysts and their research team (moreover, different
papers combine these indicators in different ways). PRS reported to us that to construct the
commonly-used ‘protection against expropriation risk’ index,
“we ‘infer’ the risk involved from the degree of accountability of the government,
the freedom of the judiciary, the level of application of the rule of law, and the level
of apparent corruption” (personal communication 15 July 2005).
We have no reason to doubt the competence or judgement of those who construct the indicators, and indeed, the fact that investors are willing to pay for this information shows that the
indicators are associated with something that investors care about.

However, the opacity of

construction of these indicators limits open debate about these judgements. Other measures of
institutional development used in these papers are subject (to greater or lesser degrees) to the
same difficulty.3
A second concern relates to arbitrary choice of weights to combine the underlying subindices (the most common index is an unweighted average of the sub-indices – the notes to
Table 1 describe the construction of the different indices of institutional quality). This makes
3

These include the BERI index, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s indices of bureaucratic efficiency and insti-

tutional efficiency, the Freedom House democracy index, and (to a much lesser degree) executive constraints and
the index of democracy (from Polity III and Polity IV). Obviously, some measures of institutional development
are not subject to this concern.

For example, the index of trust (Knack and Keefer 1997) is based on survey

responses to a specific question; readers can make their own judgement regarding the suitability of the measure.
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interpreting the estimated impact of institutional quality, and relating this estimated impact to
the true effect of the underlying institutions, problematic. To see this more clearly, consider the
basic model used in this literature
yi = β0 + βxi + υi ,

(1)

where yi is growth and xi an index of institutional development. Of course there are multiple
control variables but we exclude these for clarity (though their choice and treatment is essential).
In most cases, the literature recognizes that xi is endogenous and relies on a first stage
xi = γ0 + γzi + ξi

(2)

for some instrument zi. Again, this might include various control variables, and sometimes it is
placed into a panel data context.
Suppose, however, that the correct model is
yi = β0 + β1 x1i + β2 x2i + εi

(3)

where x1 and x2 are 2 different institutions that matter. Instead of estimating their separate
effect, papers in the cross country literature use an aggregate index of institutional quality, such
as the ICRG index of overall institutional development, defined as
xi = α1 x1i + α2 x2i

(4)

with the weight αk defined by a Political Risk Services analyst. The actual equation estimated
is (1), which is equivalent to imposing the restriction that α1 β1 = α2 β2 . If this restriction is
incorrect, what are we actually estimating?
The instrument z in (2) is related to the underlying xk by
x1i = γ10 + γ1 zi + ξ1i
x2i = γ20 + γ2 zi + ξ2i
So we have
xi = α1 γ10 + α2 γ20 + [α1 γ1 + α2 γ2 ] zi + α1 ξ1i + α2 ξ2i .

8

(5)

The probability limit of the IV estimator is
plimβ̂IV =

β1 γ1 + β2 γ2
.
α1 γ1 + α2 γ2

(6)

Three key problems are readily apparent.
First, our estimate of the effect of institutions on growth depends on the arbitrary weights
αk used to weight the various components of the index of institutional development. Therefore,
β̂IV cannot estimate a structural feature of the underlying economies.
Second, the coarseness of our measures of institutions implies that we estimate a ‘composite’
effect of multiple institutions on growth. β̂IV depends on the underlying structural relationship
between specific institutions and growth, but not in a simple fashion. While institutional measures are correlated, it is clear that the economic interpretation of, say, ‘executive constraints’
and ‘private credit’ differ. We would, therefore, want to distinguish between their effects on
growth. However, our measures of institutions do not permit rich disaggregation.4
Third, even when more disaggregated measures of institutions are available, there is a clear
paucity of plausible instruments that can serve to identify the causal effect of institutions on
growth. There are few variables that are important determinants of the current form of a
particular economic institution and that do not have effects on growth other than through
that institution. Hence, important as these variables might be as determinants of a particular
institution, an IV strategy can rarely isolate the causal pathway. Since these broad underlying
features of an economy (e.g., settler mortality, colonial history, position on the earth’s sphere)
have myriad effects on the institutions and economic organization of a society they are not valid
instruments for any particular institution. Indeed, there is a real danger that the instrument may
have different relationships with the underlying institutions; that is, that γk might have opposite
signs.
4

In this case, the estimated β̂IV can fall outside the range of the underlying βk .

One

The composite nature of the estimated β̂ is not a consequence of the IV strategy. If υi is uncorrelated with

xi , then the probability limit of the OLS estimator of (1) is
plimβ̂ =

α1 β1 σx21 + α2 β2 σx22 + (α2 β1 + α1 β2 )σx21 x2
.
α12 σx21 + α22 σx22 + 2α1 α2 σx21 x2

While this parameter can give a broad-brush picture of the relationship between institutions and growth, it will
be hard to say anything about the relative importance of the components of the composite indicators. If these
components are negatively correlated, then the estimated β̂ may even fall outside the range of [β1 , β2 ]
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context in which this might happen is where there is a trade-off between the institutions, where
improving one institution might be at the cost of worsening another. This should arise most
commonly when there are negotiation or cost trade-offs in the construction and development of
institutions.
B. Omitted Variables
We noted earlier that, in every case, an IV approach strengthens the positive effect of institutional quality on growth performance. There is no doubt that the measures of institutions are
afflicted by classical measurement error. However, because of the unquestionable ubiquity of
omitted unobserved variables, it is worth considering their effect on the IV estimates as well.
Consider the simplest form of omitted variables bias. Despite the use of very broad indices
of institutions, other institutions are unmeasured and left out of the estimated equation. That
is, (??) is constructed using α1 = 1 and α2 = 0. The probability limit of β̂IV is now
plimβ̂IV = β1 + β2

γ2
.
γ1

(7)

This leads to an overestimate if the correlations between the instrument and the different institutions have the same sign. Indeed, since
plimβ̂OLS = β1 + β2 ρx1 x2

σx2
,
σx1

(8)

the IV estimator can have a larger upward bias than the OLS estimator.
Indices of institutions used in the cross-country literature are very strongly biased towards
measuring the institutional environment facing urban, formal sector agents.

In some cases

this is explicit: Political Risk Services attempts to gauge the “risk of expropriation of foreign
private investment by government.” Other measures focus strongly on de jure procedures that
may or may not govern actual behavior. The ‘index of legal formalism’ measures the number
of formal legal procedures needed for collecting on a bounced check. Some might argue that
the institutions facing agents in the formal sector are the most salient for the overall growth
prospects of a country.

However, the possibility that the de facto environment within which

the majority of the population lives is at least as relevant suggests that omitted variable bias
can be serious.
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C. Heterogenous Treatment Effects
A different concern relates to within country heterogeneity in the characteristics and operation
of particular institutions.5 For instance, any measure of ‘trust’ will vary across communities and
individuals within communities. Mechanisms of contract enforcement take very different forms
for rural and urban entrepreneurs. The institutional framework within which corruption occurs
is likely to operate very differently for multinational corporations and small-scale traders.
More formally, significant differences across and within countries in individual responses to
institutions can significantly affect the appropriateness of using an IV strategy (Imbens and
Angrist (1994), Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and Manning (2004)). IV estimates capture the
impact of the institutional variable on the growth outcomes of those countries in which the
institutional outcome is sensitive to the value of the instrumental variables. The interpretation
of the IV estimate as the average of the effect of the institution on growth depends on special
assumptions on the way that countries respond to the institution and way that the institution
responds to the instrument. A simple version of the model is
yi = β0 + β1i Ii + εi

(9)

Ii = γ0 + γ1i zi + υi .

(10)

and we have available an instrument

In this case both stages of the IV are characterized by heterogeneous effects.

We know that

(after we make the helpful assumptions that β1i and γ1i are independent of εi , υi and zi , that
E(γ1i ) 6= 0 and that E(υi |zi ) = E(εi |zi ) = 0):
β̂1IV →p

E(β1i γ1i )
.
E(γ1i )

(11)

If β1i and γ1i are independent of each other, then β̂1IV →p E(β1i ), which may be what we want.
However, consider the following plausible form of heterogeneity. Suppose β1i = β1 + β2 xi , where
xi is some unobserved omitted variable that influences the effect of the institution on growth.
We normalize xi to have mean zero. For example, suppose xi is some unobserved dimension of
5

Brown and Guinnane (2005) discuss the deleterious consequences of analysis that obscures internal hetero-

geneity in the well-known European Fertility Project.
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precolonial history (such as the security of land tenure) that changes the effect of formal credit
market expansion on growth. To fix ideas, β2 > 0 – better tenure security increases the effect
of credit markets on growth.
At the same time, of course, γ1i = γ1 + γ2 xi , because the same omitted feature will influence
the degree to which current institutions (Ii ) depend on our observed instrument (say, settler
mortality). If γ2 is also positive, the IV estimator will exceed the true causal effect. Specifically,
β̂1IV

→
=

p E(β1i γ1i )

E(β1 + β2 xi )(γ1 + γ2 xi )
E(γ1i )
E(γ1 + γ2 xi )
β2 γ2 var(x)
β1 γ1 + β2 γ2 var(x)
= β1 +
> β1 = E(βi )
γ1
γ1
=

This simple example suggests that IV estimation techniques in the presence of hetereogeneity
in institutional form within a single country can cause the IV to overestimate the true effect.
Below, we use the example of land law in Africa to demonstrate that such within-country
heterogeneity is commonplace in many low income countries.

2.3

The Limitations in Practice

We now examine two particular instances which illustrate the empirical relevance of these limitations of the cross-country methodology that has dominated this literature.
A. Institutions and Poverty
The typical institutions regression has GDP per capita as the dependent variable. As development economists, however, we should be at least as interested in the determinants of poverty.
What can we learn by replacing GDP with a poverty measure, the head count ratio, in this
canonical regression?
There is reason for some skepticism. As institutional measures tend to focus on the urban
and formal sector, we would expect them to have less impact when we consider poverty, which
depends particularly strongly on features of the rural and informal economy.
Table 2 reports these regressions. Our measure of institutional quality is ‘Protection against
Expropriation Risk’ and we use log settler mortality as the instrument. Following Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) we start with the sample of 64 ex-colonies with settler mortality
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data. We have poverty data for 43 of these countries. Our poverty measure is the headcount ratio, defined as the percentage of the population living in households with consumption
or income per per person below the global poverty line, defined as one dollar per day (Source:
PovCal Net, World Bank). We use the median head-count ratio value, over 1981-2001 (typically,
this ratio is reported at three year intervals). We also report results where we include the four
OECD countries which were ex-colonies and set their headcount ratio to zero.
Panel A provides OLS results. We observe a strong and significant negative correlation
between protection against expropriation risk and the headcount ratio. A one standard deviation
increase in institutional quality reduces the percentage population that is poor by 10% in our
base specification. This estimate is relatively unchanged by the inclusion of a geography control
and continent dummies. Panel B provides 2SLS estimates, and Panel C the corresponding first
stage regression. Excluding controls, the 2SLS estimate is twice the size of the OLS (column
(1)) while with controls the 2SLS estimate is four times the size of the OLS estimate (column
(3)). If we were to take the column (3) estimate seriously it would suggest that a one standard
deviation increase in institutional quality would move the country from the 75th to the 25th
percentile of the distribution of the headcount ratio. This is a much more dramatic effect than
is observed in the corresponding growth regression, where a one standard deviation increase
in protection against expropriation leads to a 2.7-fold increase in income, which corresponds
approximately to a move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of the distribution of income per
capita. It is very likely that settler mortality is correlated with other, unobserved, features of the
rural environment that are much more important for poverty outcomes than the protection that
foreign investors have against expropriation by the central government.

These same omitted

features of the rural environment may also be associated with a stronger treatment effect of the
effect of improved security of formal property rights on rural poverty. In both instances, the
IV estimator will overestimate the effect of these institutions on poverty.
B. Land Law
Aggregate formal sector based indices of institutional quality are unlikely to capture institutional
quality as faced by the average person in developing countries. Further, heterogenous treatment
effects may be a real concern in developing countries where social and ethnic networks remain
13

an important constraint on individual decision-making.
To illustrate these concerns we describe property rights in land in four African countries.
We choose the best and worst performing African countries according to the expropriation risk
index used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). These are Gambia and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire, henceforth DRC). In addition we choose Ghana, a country
we study in more detail below, and its neighbor Cote’d Ivoire. These two countries offer an
interesting contrast of neighboring countries which were ruled by different colonial powers. The
legal origins variable codes Ghana and Gambia as having English law, and DRC and Cote’d
Ivoire as having French Law. Table 3 describes property rights in land for these four countries.
(i) De Jure and De Facto Land Rights: The Importance of ‘Customary’ Law
Measures of ‘institutions’ in the cross-country literature are typically based on either formal rules
and procedures or perceptions of those working in the urban business sector. It is immediate from
Table 3 that what matters for rural land rights is the country’s community-based mechanisms as
exemplified by customary law. The use of almost all land in these four countries is governed by
customary tenure arrangements, not formal sector rules. The influence, if any, of the formal legal
system introduced by colonial powers on land rights as experienced by households is indirect.
This is not to say that an analysis of de jure rights is uninteresting: such an analysis is
essential for understanding the importance of changing formal laws regarding property, and
such changes may an important instrument for policy. However, it is clear that any exercise
examining the effect on economic activity of property rights as they are actually experienced by
agents cannot restrict attention to the de jure legal system.
We observe a stark contrast between de jure and de facto property rights in these countries.
French authorities typically did not recognize land ownership by traditional chiefs. In contrast,
in colonies without significant white settlement, the British policy of indirect rule included (the
colonists’ interpretation of) customary land tenure rules. In terms of de jure laws, our Table
suggests this is reflected in a more limited recognition of customary law in French colonized
countries (DRC and Cote’d Ivoire). However, there is no close correspondence between ‘legal
origins’ and de facto land tenure rights in these four countries. In the French colonized countries
war seems to have played a more important role in defining the security of property rights.
14

Further, a central tenet of customary law that, for most part, individuals cannot sell land on
which they have user rights, remains relevant in the rural sector of all countries, save Cote’d
Ivoire (for Gambia, see Freudenberger (2000), for Ghana, see of Lands and Forestry (2003), and
for DRC, Moyroud and Katunga (2002)).
Equally, there is no clear relationship between ‘average protection against expropriation’
and the likelihood that a cultivator is confident of his or her control over land. While Gambia
is a clear outlier in this group of four, categorized as having much higher protection against
expropriation, use rights in some areas of the Gambia are less well-established than those in
much of Ghana (in particular, use rights are very secure in Ghana’s cocoa-producing areas).
Protection against expropriation in the DRC is rated as extremely poor relative to that in Côte
d’Ivoire, but tenure security seems to be quite similar in areas of both countries less affected by
their respective wars.
(ii) Land Rights are Heterogeneous Within Countries
Customary law has nearly full legal recognition in Gambia (Freudenberger 2000), and none in
the DRC (Leisz 1998). In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire it has only partial recognition. Further,
the complexity of de facto land rights hinders the interpretation of “secure property rights”.
Customary law tends to view land and resources as inalienable, such that property rights cannot
be wholly ceded by those to whom the land has been allocated (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994b).
As a consequence, in none of the countries included in Table 3 is anything approaching freehold
tenure common in agriculture. In Côte d’Ivoire, land sales are generally permitted by customary
law(Kone 2002), which could appear to be an indication of more secure tenure than exists in
most of Ghana. However, usufruct rights are generally secure in most of Ghana while the land
is under cultivation (even including tree crops) (Amanor 1999), while the usufruct rights of the
large population of non-Ivoirian migrants in Côte d’Ivoire are very insecure (Chauveau 2000).
Apparently, property rights over land are more secure in Ghana than in Côte d’Ivoire for some
individuals, while for others the opposite is true. Within any of the countries listed in the table
there is a distribution of tenure security; clearly, the usefulness of summarizing that distribution
with a single index is sensitive to the context and the economic model.
Further, the same piece of land can be subject to multiple claims which relate to the ways
15

in which it is used by separate groups and individuals at different levels.

For example, one

individual may have the right to cultivate annual crops on a plot, while another retains rights
to the tree crops that exist on the same land. An elder might have the right to allocate a plot
to a family member for temporary use, but not the right to rent the plot to an outsider on a
commercial basis. Property rights are typically multidimensional and collapsing this down to a
single index might be misleading in important ways.
(iii) Political and Contractual Institutions are Intertwined
A common distinction in the cross country institutions literature has been between political institutions (as measured by, say, expropriation risk), and institutions which determine contractual
form (as measured by, say, legal origins). However, the real world is much more complicated,
and, in particular, this distinction is treacherous when considering land rights in Africa. Indigenous tenure principles are implemented and arbitrated by authorities (chiefs, lineage heads,
elders) whose legitimacy is typically drawn from a local political process. Their authority over
land allocation is political power, since it enables them to give or refuse a farmer the right to
cultivate or to settle.

”By allowing or forbidding newcomers to settle and by fitting them,

from the outset, within a network of alliances, the land chief regulates the process where a local
community is constituted” (Raynaut 1997, 289-290).
Specific property rights as experienced by farmers often depend on both how political office
is allocated and the land allocation powers given to the politician (Udry and Goldstein 2004).
Thus, political and contractual institutions seem to be fundamentally intertwined for land tenure
processes in Africa. Importantly, the nature of such intertwining varies significantly across
countries. This again suggests heterogeneity in the effect of institutions across countries.
The extraordinary diversity of institutional practices across and within countries places natural constraints on the usefulness of cross-country analyses for understanding the specific channels through which institutions affect economic outcomes, and how these institutions, in turn,
respond to economic, demographic, political and social forces.
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3

Within-Country Institutional Variation

Recent years have seen an explosion in empirical research in development economics. One
of the most fruitful areas of research has been program evaluations in developing countries
– these typically combine household or regional level data with detailed information on the
implementation of a particular institution or policy in the country to estimate its economic
impact. In this section we discuss how this line of research can both compliment and advance
the research agenda suggested by the institutions and growth literature.
Table 4 lists some recent papers which study potential within-country counterparts of the
main institutions studied in the cross-country literature.6 While our literature review is nonexhaustive, it is clear from the Table that many synergies exist between the cross-country and
within-country literatures.
Relative to cross-country analyses, an important advantage of within-country studies is the
relative homogeneity of the institutional and constitutional setting across the units of analysis.
This potentially helps disentangle the economic impact of institutions from unobserved heterogeneity across the units of analysis. In addition, concerns of heterogenous treatment effects
may be more limited in the context of a single country. Finally, and we would argue most
importantly, the scope for identifying credible instruments for particular institutions is much
greater in the case of within-country studies. The reason is that institutional change is typically
implemented at the country (or sub-country) level. This opens up the possibility of exploiting
specific features of how institutional change was implemented across regions in a country or
across different population groups to obtain instruments for the institutional variable of interest. In contrast, both the choice and implementation of public policies varies significantly across
countries. Hence, using any single country’s experience with institutional change to identify
instruments for a cross-country analysis will typically not yield an instrument with sufficient
6

We restricted attention to the journals considered in the cross-country literature review and did a Google

scholar search where the keywords were institutions and development. We also manually reviewed the issues of
American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Journal of Political Economy for 2002-2004.
Given this set of papers, we then used our judgement to identify papers which provide a within-country counterpart
to the main institutions covered in the cross-country review. In a couple of cases, we have augmented the list
with recent unpublished papers.
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power across a large number of countries. Hence, the reliance on relatively crude instruments
such as settler mortality.
As is apparent from Table 4, a common approach is to use panel data which spans years
both before and after the policy change and to exploit cross-sectional variation in the extent of
institutional change. Such variation may arise due to timing differences in policy implementation
across different regions within the country, or because the extent of institutional change was
explicitly related to underlying economic features of the regions. The canonical regression in
this literature is of the form
Yst = αs + βt + γIst + ²st
where s denotes regions within a country and t time. Yst is the outcome of interest and Ist
the relevant institution. The inclusion of regional fixed effects (αs ) accounts for permanent
differences between regions and time fixed effects (βt ) for shocks which affects all regions. This
regression specification can not, in itself, allay the concern that the institutional variable and
the economic outcome of interest are both affected by some omitted time-varying region-specific
variable. That is, E(Ist , ²st ) 6= 0 (Besley and Case 2003). One may also be concerned about
the external validity of such a study – a study which focuses on institutional change within a
country may not be informative of the true average effect of the institution (that country may,
for instance, be much poorer than the average country in the world).
To assess whether within-country studies can address these concerns we focus in on the literature on a single institution – private land rights. Table 5 provides a non-exhaustive summary
of papers analyzing the economic impact of land titling and registration, organized by country.7
To identify the economic impact of land titling it is common to exploit the passage of land titling
or registration programs which take land claims out of the realm of informal lineage, community land ownership or informal ‘squatter’ rights and making them legal, formal and individual
(Binswanger, Deninger, and Feder 1995)
These studies span numerous countries and a multitude of different economic settings. Thus,
while the external validity of any single study may have limits it is certainly possible to compare
7

In selecting papers for this Table our aim was to show the richness of country experiences with land titling

programs.
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across studies in different regions to identify generalizable lessons. Looking across the studies
suggests the following findings:
• Land titling and registration typically increase agricultural productivity and farm investment. However, the extent of this increase depends upon the details of the titling program
and the pre-existing land tenure system.
• There is a weaker, but usually positive, effect on credit. The impact of titling on credit is
very limited in situations with less developed credit markets.
• There is some evidence that land value rises, but this remains very preliminary.
It is clear that endogenous uptake of land titles presents a serious concern for empirical
evaluations, and that not all papers address this concern adequately. However, the potential
for using the institutional details of the land titling intervention to identify credible instruments
for exposure to land titling far exceeds that available in the context of a cross-country study.
A good example is Field (2003a) who analyzes the value to a squatter household in Peru of
increases in tenure security associated with obtaining a property title as measured by his/her
labor supply response. A national titling program in Peru issued formal property titles over a
five-year period to more than 1.2 million urban households. Field uses two sources of variation
in program influence to isolate the effect of titling: neighborhood program timing and program
impact based on prior household ownership status. In particular, staggered regional program
timing enables a comparison of households in neighborhoods already reached by the program
with households in neighborhoods not yet reached. She combines these facts with data on past
and future title recipients (collected half way through the titling program) to identify a natural
set of comparison groups composed of treated and yet-to-be-treated households. A comparison
of the labor supply behavior of these two sets of households can be interpreted as reflecting
the causal effect of land titling. Similar empirical methods are used by Banerjee, Gertler, and
Ghatak (2002) in the context of India and Do and Iyer in the context of Vietnam. The absence
of a unifying institutional environment implies that such studies could not be undertaken at the
cross-country level.
Finally, the fact that the economic effect of land titles depends on the existence of complimentary institutions, the details of the titling program and the pre-existing land tenure system
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points to the importance of accounting for heterogenous effects. It would appear that an important and relatively unexplored area for research is to use within-country studies to better
understand the source of such heterogeneity.

4

8

Within Institution Variation: Insecure Property Rights in
Ghana

A given institution can provide a variety of incentives to different individuals, depending on their
endowments. This makes it possible to use data on the behavior of individuals within a given
institutional setting to explore the consequences of an institution for behavior, and potentially
of changing factor endowments for institutional form. In this section we use household survey
data from Ghana to provide one example of such research.
Over 60 percent of the Ghanaian population is in the agricultural sector, and land distribution
is mostly governed by customary law. Under customary law, land is often regarded as a common
asset and resource. Individual ownership is recognized for standing crops, but not for the soil
itself. Rather, ultimate title over land is vested in corporate groups, in particular in the lineage,
and individuals gain access to land via membership in such groups. There are multiple potential
claimants to any particular plot; competing claims are negotiated and certain members of the
community are recognized as having the power to arbitrate such conflicts. Land rights in the
study area are complex, ambiguous and highly negotiable (Udry and Goldstein 2004). Given
this, we examine how micro-data can be used to understand the implications of this land tenure
system for investment and agricultural productivity. Further, we explore whether changing
factor endowments in Ghana have affected the cost of having insecure property rights, and the
responses of political actors and citizens.

4.1

The Investment and Productivity effects of Land Rights

Our data comes from a two year rural survey in the Akwapim South District of the Eastern Region of Ghana conducted by Goldstein and Udry (for survey description and data, see
8

We also note that the equity effects of titling remain very controversial; so far, there has been little research

that effectively identifies the long run relationship between titling and the distributions of wealth and income.
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www.econ.yale.edu/˜cru2/ghanadata.html).
The main farming system is an intercropped mixture of maize and cassava, which is cultivated for both home consumption and sale through a well-developed marketing system. Land
productivity is managed primarily through fallowing; cultivation is periodically stopped in order
for nutrients to be restored and for weeds and other pests to be controlled. An element of the
land tenure system that plays a key role in the evolution of its agricultural economy is that
cultivators have historically had very secure rights over their growing crops (both tree crops and
annual crops). Wilks summarizes the principle as “afuo mu yε deε, asase yε ohene deε” (“the
farm is my property, the land is the stool’s”).
However, the lineage leadership may reallocate fallow land to other members of the lineage.
The details of this allocation process are unique to the local context, but many of its broad
features arise frequently in African (particularly West African) land tenure systems.

9

In our

study area land is held by the abusua, which is defined by matrilineal descent, on the authority
of the paramount chief (or stool ). The leadership of the matrilineage is locally-based and is
responsible for allocating use rights within a village to members of the matrilineage.10 The
allocation of land within the matrilineage is rooted in local politics and social relations.11
Land allocation is, thus, a political process that operates at the level of the local matrilineage.
Cultivators on the margins of local political power – those who hold no form of local political
office – are less confident of their rights over land than those who have local political office.
Table 6 presents evidence of this difference in confidence.12
(Udry and Goldstein 2004) use these survey data to establish that insecurity of land tenure
is associated with lower investment in land and hence reduced agricultural production. Table
7 summarizes the main consequences of this difference in tenure security for fallowing behavior
and hence for output. Conditional on observed characteristics of the plot, office holders leave
plots fallow for approximately 2 years longer than non-officeholders, and each additional year
9

Fred-Mensah (1996); Biebuyck (1963);Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1994a); Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder

(1995); Bassett (1993); Peters (1994) and Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1994a)Bromley (1989)
10
In our sample leaders tend to be male and older than other members of our sample, but no more likely to be
educated.
11
(Berry 2001, 145)
12
There is a wide variety of local political offices held by individuals in our sample.
lineage or village head or elder.
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Typical offices include

of fallowing is associated with an increase in plot profits per-hectare of over 300 thousand cedis
(compare this magnitude with the mean gross output per hectare of about 1.2 million cedis, or to
per-capita GDP of approximately 700 thousand cedis). (Udry and Goldstein 2004) estimate the
magnitude of the loss associated with this inefficient fallowing to be approximately one-third
of output.13 Some plots are obtained through commercial transactions (about half through
fixed-rent contracts, and half through sharecropping), rather than through the allocation of
matrilineage land.

If we look (in column (3)) at fallow duration by form of land allocation

we observe that commercially-obtained plots are fallowed for longer (slightly over half a year).
Further, office holders and non-office holders exhibit similar behavior on commercial plots. In
column (4) we continue to observe increased fallowing of commercial plots when we compare
across different plots cultivated by an individual farmer.

4.2

The Evolution of Land Rights

The insecurity of land tenure in this farming system is associated with a very large cost of lost
output. Why, then, did it emerge and does it persist?
A. Background
The abusua-based land tenure system in southern Ghana emerged before the 19th century, as
part of a political system in which political power flowed through the matrilineage.14 During
13

See (Udry and Goldstein 2004) for full details of the econometric procedures.

These estimates are all

conditional on household*year fixed effects (except column 4, which uses finer individual fixed effects) because
imperfect factor markets in these villages imply variation across households in the shadow costs of factors of
production. Each also includes spatial fixed effects (with neighborhoods defined as a distance of 250 meters) to
better account for unobserved variation in land characteristics. Estimates are also conditional on a set of plot
characteristics including deciles of plot area, and indicators of soil type, and toposequence. The magnitude of the
production loss is based on estimates of a concave production function specified as πit = Xip β+g(dit )+λhip ,t +²ipt ,
where Xit includes the control variables listed above, λ is the household*year fixed effect, and dit is the fallow

(

duration on plot i.

g (d) is specified as g(dit ) =

α ln(dit + γ) −

α
d
7+γ it

f or dit ≤ 7

where the 2nd term
f or dit > 7
α ln(7 + γ) −
ensures that the derivative of the function is 0 at dit = 7, because of evidence in the soil science literature from this
α
7
7+γ

region that fallow periods longer than 7 years are unlikely to have further positive effects on farm productivity.
14
“The elementary level of political organization in precolonial Asante ... was the matrilineage (abusua, pl.
mmusua). It was through membership of an abusua that free (non-slave) Asantes were integrated into the polity.
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this period, and even into the early 20th century, “land for cultivation was abundant in the
strict sense that the marginal product of land must have been zero. ...[F]rom what is known of
the soils, crop repertoire and farming techniques, fallows were long enough for full restoration
of soil fertility.” (Austin 2004, p. 64.). Even in the most densely-populated areas of southern
Ghana (near Kumasi, the capital of the Asante state), population densities were under 30
people per square kilometer, permitting average fallow periods of over a decade. The role of
the matrilineage leadership was to secure the rights of cultivators to cultivated plots. This they
did; while cultivators could have no expectation of re-establishing cultivation on a fallowed plot,
the investment of labor in clearing and cultivating a plot ensured that the farmer would retain
control over the plot until it was fallowed.
The early years of the 20th century saw southern Ghana become the world’s largest grower
of cocoa (Hill 1963).

Between 1910 and 1940, thousands of people made substantial long-

term investments in cocoa trees, which began to reach maturity after 5 − 7 years, and could
continue to produce for decades. These investments were facilitated by a fortuitous concurrence
between the land tenure system and the agronomic characteristics of cocoa.

The security of

an individual’s rights over a cultivated plot was long-established, and was reinforced during
the early 20th century by both the newly-established British colonial government and by the
Councils of Chiefs. Once planted, cocoa often stood on a plot for decades. While it stood, the
cultivator’s rights to use, rent, or mortgage the plot were secure.15
Over the 20th century, the first signs of the elimination of land abundance began to emerge.
Fallow periods for land not under cocoa cultivation began to decline, and disputes between matrilineages or between chiefs over the boundaries of their land became more common (Firmin-Sellers
1996)(Berry 2001). While these disputes engaged higher-level political actors, the usufruct rights
of cultivators were protected; “farmers kept their farms even when their chief had been defeated
in litigation over the ownership of the land” (Austin 2004, p. 277).
As long as cocoa remained the foundation of the rural agrarian economy, neither the colonial
state nor the immediate post-independence government proceeded with any formal effort to
privatize or title rural land. There were three crucial reasons for this. First, both chiefs and
The matrilineage head owed allegiance to a sub-chief.” (Austin 2004, p. 35).
15
(Austin 2004, p. 269).
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government officials expressed fear that a consequence of titling would be the establishment of a
landless class. Whatever inefficiencies might be associated with the complex and ambiguous land
tenure system existing in Ghana, the principle that all members of a local corporate group are
entitled to cultivate land ensured that no substantial disenfranchised group of landless persons
ever emerged.

Second, the effort would involve substantial administrative costs.

Third and

most important, there was no apparent need for privatization. “It is evident that the land
tenure system[s], both in the Gold Coast Colony and in Asante, offered cocoa farmers what
they regarded as sufficient security of tenure to make very widespread long-term investments”
(Firmin-Sellers 1996, p. 346).
However, by the 1970s, the cocoa economy was in full-fledged collapse, due primarily to
extraordinarily high rates of explicit and implicit taxation of exports (Aryeetey, Harrigan, and
Nissanke (2000)Bates (1981)).

Farmers across Ghana exited cocoa production and increased

production of food crops. At the same time, land scarcity was becoming increasingly evident.
As cultivation switched from a tree crop to annual food crops, the key to maintaining soil
fertility and hence productivity became sufficient fallowing. Therefore, the insecurity of rights
over fallowed land was beginning to have important costs.

During this period, however, the

administrative structure of the Ghanaian state itself was near collapse(Aryeetey, Harrigan, and
Nissanke 2000).

The national government simply did not have the capacity for a significant

land titling program, and thus focused its few resources on registering urban land16 .
The inability of the national government to implement a titling program that would resolve
the ambiguities of the land tenure system is apparent, but the lack of a local solution to the
inefficiencies uncovered above is more puzzling. In our study area, the transition from cocoa to
the intercropped mixture of maize and cassava occurred much earlier than in most of Ghana.
Although Akwapim was the first location in Ghana to adopt cocoa on a large scale at the
start of the 20th century, it is not particularly well-suited for cocoa cultivation. By the 1940s,
a devastating outbreak of swollen shoot disease had led to the breakdown of the local cocoa
farming system, and maize and cassava production for sale to local urban markets became the
mainstay of local agriculture.
16

There are formal procedures for land registration, defined in the 1986 Land Title Registration Law (PNDCL

152), but these are virtually never used outside urban areas.
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Insecure Land Tenure as a form of Social Security
It is clear that understanding the persistence of this land tenure regime requires an understanding
of the local political economy under which it exists, and of the role that this land tenure system
serves beyond its effect on investment incentives. Historically, an important source of resistance
to titling has been the fear that landlessness would result. An important rationale for the
allocation of land use rights via membership in the matrilineage is redistribution. Limited
access to credit markets remains pervasive in rural Ghana, and so land redistribution is seen as
essential to preventing long term poverty
An important mandate of local political leaders is to prevent landlessness. The flexible land
tenure system has successfully prevented the emergence of a landless class.17

Given imper-

fections in other factor markets, the efficiency gain from equalizing land ownership per capita
across households can potentially offset some of the loss associated with reduced fallowing due
to insecurity of tenure rights. Lack of panel data that tracks households over very long periods
prevents us from directly examining the degree to which land is reallocated in response to demographic shocks. However, detailed data on the demographic composition of households suggests
that the magnitude of demographic shocks is not large enough to make this an efficient mechanism. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are gains associated with this kind of redistribution
in response to demographic shocks, and perhaps a more diffuse gain associated with the lack of
any landless class.
In the cross-section, we see little correlation between allocations of matrilineage land and
the demographic composition of households.

The only strong correlations we find are that

households with older and more politically-powerful heads have more land. There is little evidence of important differences in living standards as household demographics change; per-capita
expenditures decline weakly with household size and strongly with the ratio of children in the
household.
In informal conversation, people in the study area claim that the allocation of land by the
abusua leadership is driven at least in part by one’s ‘need’. Any member of the abusua who
needs land is entitled to some for cultivation. The determination of “need”, not surprisingly, is
17

Only two households in our sample have no land; in both cases the husband has an office job and the wife is

a trader.
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often contentious. The claim was made by several of our respondents that the act of leaving a
plot fallow would demonstrate a lack of sufficient need, and therefore cast doubt on one’s right
to the plot. If this claim is true, then it must be the case that ‘need’ is private information, and
that the extent of one’s need can be signalled by choices with respect to fallowing.
It is apparent that there is far from complete information about individuals’ resources in
rural Ghana.

Most adults in rural Ghana engage in non-farm activities to complement their

direct income from agriculture.

In our sample, 65 percent of adults and almost 80 percent

of women earn income from non-farm activities. Small-scale trading is the dominant activity
of this type.

Information regarding the income that is generated from non-farm activities is

closely-held; even spouses are unlikely to know the details of one’s incomes and expenditures from
nonfarm enterprises (Goldstein 2000, chapter 1). Therefore, we assume that the matrilineage
leadership cannot observe directly the extent of an individual’s ‘need’ for additional land.
The abusua leader seeks to keep matrilineage land for his own personal or commercial use,
while meeting his obligation to provide land to matrilineage members who have high need for
that land. These are individuals have particularly low return off-farm opportunities – the poor.
Failure by the leadership to allocate land to a sufficiently high proportion of the poor exposes
the leaders to political penalties in the future. Hence, the leader seeks to allocate land to as
many of the poor as possible, while keeping it out of the hands of the rich. We are motivated in
this assumption by the observation that chieftaincy disputes, and disputes between villagers and
abusua leaders, often center around perceived misallocation of abusua land by the leadership (
(Berry 2001, chapter 2); Benneh (1988)).
We hypothesize that the leadership uses a cultivation requirement to construct an incentivecompatible mechanism that separates (most of) the poor from (most of) the rich. The leadership
offers land to those who will cultivate it without leaving it fallow. Keeping a plot in cultivation
requires farming effort and thus lost income from nonfarm activities.

The rich are generally

unwilling to accept this contract: the sacrifice of their high nonfarm income would outweigh
the benefit of cultivating poorly-fallowed land. The poor, however, typically find the tradeoff
worthwhile and accept the land.18
18

See (Berry 2001, chapter 2) for a formal treatment of the model. The model is related to that of Banerjee

(1997). In his model, monetary rents are extracted from the rich, while here it is land that is captured. The
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The abusua leader can set the cultivation requirement to be more or less stringent. He has
a certain amount of land that he can allocate. He has an obligation to allocate a unit of land
to each poor farmer; this is the core social contract.

If he fails to allocate land to the poor,

he faces possible penalties in the form of litigation costs of defending himself in a chieftaincy
dispute, or gifts and favors to the abusua elders to induce them to ignore the complaints. His
problem is that he can not observe the off-farm earnings of most of the members of the abusua.
If he offers land with no conditions, of course the entire population will accept the land. Hence,
he uses the cultivation requirement to attempt to screen out rich members while still getting
land to the poor.
The tradeoff is clear: an increases in the cultivation requirement increase the amount of
land available for the leader to cultivate, but also increases the number of the poor who are not
allocated land and hence the probability that the leader will be penalized. His choice is guided
by balancing these conflicting objectives.
This model of land allocation has features that correspond well to both the informal accounts
of tenure insecurity that we received from cultivators themselves, and to patterns of investment
behavior that are evident in our data.

In column 1 of Table 8, we show that individuals

who talk frequently (at least twice a week) with office holders have fallowing behavior that is
essentially indistinguishable from office holders themselves. This is consistent with the idea of a
cultivation requirement that is imposed as a way of distinguishing the poor from the rich among
those about whom the officeholders have incomplete information. Officeholders have better
information regarding the resources of those with whom they interact sufficiently intensively,
and hence need not impose this costly revelation device.

This result is also consistent with

officeholders sharing rents with their friends.
As matrilineage land resources become more scarce (relative to the matrilineage population),
the leadership will impose stricter cultivation requirements. The marginal value of additional
land kept under their own control rises as land becomes more scarce, so the leadership is more
willing to risk the penalty associated with failure to allocate land to some of the poor. Therefore,
the gap between the fallow durations of non-office holders and office holders would tend to be
larger in matrilineages in which land is more scarce. In column 2 of table 8, we see unsurprisingly
public observability of fallowing choices in our context is at the root of this difference.
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that fallow durations are, in general, shorter in more densely-populated matrilineages.

In

column 3, we observe that the difference in fallowing by office holders and others rises with
population density in the matrilineage.

The interquartile range of the number of households

per hectare in a matrilineage is approximately 1.5. These estimates imply that officeholders in a
‘poor’ matrilineage (at the 75th percentile of households/hectare) have a fallow duration about
5 years longer (relative to other households in the matrilineage) than households in a ‘wealthy’
matrilineage at the 25th percentile of households/hectare.
These results suggest that increasing population density has affected the economic well-being
of non-office holders more than that of office-holders. We next examine whether office-holders
actually do better in more densely populated matrilineages. Table 9 suggests this is not the case.
As we expect, leaders in matrilineages with more land per capita are better educated, farm much
more themselves, have larger families, and maintain consumption per capita in their families.
However, in contrast with the model, the gap between the education, area cultivated, household
size, and per capita expenditure of officeholders and the rest of the population increases with
the availability of land in the matrilineage.
To summarize, it appears that the flexible system of allocating temporary usufruct rights
through a political process at the matrilineage level has served a reallocative purpose, helping
avoid the emergence of a class of destitute landless in the villages. We also find evidence that
this system is inefficient, with the cost of inefficiency mainly borne by those not holding political
office. Finally, we find the efficiency cost of this system of insurance is apparently increasing
with population density. Moreover, it appears that village leaders do worse in more land scarce
matrilineages, suggesting that this may be an environment where the local population and
leaders share a common interest in improving the security of property rights.
The transition away from a system of insecure property rights may take many forms. We
begin by noting that as land gained value over the course of the early 20th century, both the
courts and the chieftaincy councils maintained two principles that checked the opportunism
of the contemporary generation of matrilineage leaders. First was a strict prohibition on the
sale of land to outsiders without approval from higher-level authorities.

All land under the

control of a particular matrilineage was granted to it by a higher-level chief (called a ‘stool’)
who retained a superior form of ownership: “... what we may call inferior ownership meant
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that a lineage owned its land subject to continued performance of its members’ obligations as
subjects, and acknowledgement of the ultimate and reversionary claim of the village headman
or stool which had originally granted it the land.” (Austin 2004, 101.) (also see (Berry 2001,
146-7)). It was the obligation of the stool to ensure that land remained available for the use
of his subjects; therefore, only he had the right to sell land to outsiders. There is no question
that a number of stools have sold land to outsiders, particularly in urban areas, but in general
such sales have been rare and when attempted have often resulted in the destoolment of the
chief (Berry 2001). Second was a resistance to granting permanent rights to land over local
individuals.

Current leaders could not guarantee cultivators the right to restart cultivation

after fallowing. The most visible mechanism used to inhibit the transfer of long-term rights was
the prohibition on permitting land to move outside the matrilineage via patrilineal inheritance.
In most lineages the leadership carefully monitored allocated land to ensure that it was not
passed down from father to son.

This was often a source for land disputes, because fathers

were generally permitted to ‘lend’ matrilineage land to their sons for brief periods (Austin 2004,
174).
In effect, these two restrictions have acted as formal barriers to abusua leaders using their
powers to create more permanent property rights. Pervasive imperfections in capital markets
have also limited this transformation. The large inefficiencies associated with the uncertainties
of tenure security imply the existence of substantial gains if the matrilineage leadership could
guarantee long-term tenure security.

However, the benefits from this transformation would

be spread far into the future, over a period of decades.

With imperfect capital markets, the

cultivators receiving long-term tenure security would not be able to pay the present value of this
long-term gain. Nor could they commit to a long-term stream of future payments, for the same
limited commitment reasons that long-term capital markets are so imperfect in these villages.19
The barriers to movement towards long-term security of land tenure are substantial. Nevertheless, we do observe cross-sectional evidence that villagers find ways around these barriers
where they are particularly costly. In column 1 of Table 10, we show that individuals in matrilineages that have particularly intense population pressure on matrilineage land spend more
19

Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) use this same argument in their discussion of the development of freehold

tenure in land abundant agriculture.
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time on non-farm activities than individuals in less densely-populated matrilineages.

Office-

holders are exempt from this pattern – they spend more time on non-farm activities in less
densely-populated matrilineages. This is in line with our model, which suggests office holders
will place more stringent fallowing requirements and extract more land in a more densely populated abusua. And it is in those matrilineages that the fallowing behavior of office holders and
others differs the most that individuals will concentrate their time on nonfarm activities.
In column 2 of Table 10, we show that farmers in more densely-populated matrilineages are
more likely to use commercial transactions to obtain land. Recall that in Table 7, we showed
that fallowing choices on commercial land are independent of officeholding status, and that
(within individuals) fallow periods on commercially-obtained plots are substantially longer than
on abusua land. Therefore, we see that in those matrilineages in which abusua land is under
more severe population pressure (and that have shorter fallow periods, as seen in Table 10, a
larger proportion of cultivated land is obtained through commercial fixed-rent and sharecropping
contracts. Office-holders, on the other hand, do not respond to population pressure by moving
towards cultivating commercially-obtained land, because (as in ??) they use their control over
the land allocation process to mitigate the consequences of that pressure.
These results must be considered tentative, because they depend on variation at a given
moment in time across a very limited number of matrilineages. However, they are suggestive that
population pressure is inducing actions that may have the long-term consequence of transforming
the land tenure system of the study area.

5

Conclusion

Gross correlations between institutional development and growth observed in cross-country data
have provided a persuasive case that long-run growth is faster in countries that have higher
quality contracting institutions, better law enforcement, increased protection of private property
rights, improved central government bureaucracy, smoother operating formal sector financial
markets, increased levels of democracy, and higher levels of trust.
This literature also suggests that understanding the channels of influence, and why such
extreme variation in institutional quality persists are research questions of central importance.
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However, the scope of using cross-country data for identifying the channels of influence is limited. The measurement of ‘institutions’ at the country level is necessarily coarse, and obscures
important dimensions of heterogeneity.

Even more important, there are very few plausible

sources of exogenous variation in country-level institutions that can serve to identify the causal
effect of institutions on growth. It is this fact that in the end most severely limits the range of
questions that can be addressed with this methodology. For instance, a paper which relies on
institutional persistence to obtain instruments for institutional quality will be hard pressed to
identify institutional evolution. Further, we argue that due consideration must be given to the
appropriate unit of analysis when considering the relationships between institutions and economic activity. A unit smaller than a country may provide a more homogeneous environment
for a given institution, and therefore reveal more about the causal role of that institution.
These observations lead us to point to the empirical research based on micro-data in development economics and suggest that the research methodologies pursued in this literature can
help make progress on the above issues. One such opportunity is presented by country-specific
policies that implement institutional change. Exploiting within-country variation implies a focus
on a more homogenous environment. Further, it is often possible to exploit features of the policy implementation process to obtain instruments which can help isolate the effect of a specific
institution.
A given institutional setting can provide a rich variety of incentives to different individuals,
depending upon their economic, social or political position. In section 4 we provide an example
from Ghana. We describe the complex land tenure system that exists in one region of Ghana.
In this system, individuals have very different levels of tenure security, depending upon their
position in a local political hierarchy. We show how this variation in the degree of security can
be exploited to identify the implications of tenure security for investment in land.

We also

discuss the historical evolution of this land tenure system, and provide some evidence regarding
actions that individuals are currently taking to mitigate the dramatic inefficiencies associated
with tenure insecurity. Our evidence suggests that these actions have the potential to transform
the land tenure system of the region, and suggest that a close examination of individual actions
may help us understand how institutional change is initiated in economic environments facing
changing economic and demographic pressures.
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III. Private credit/GDP (1998)
IV. Average stock market
capitalization3/GDP (1990-1995)

I. Contracting institutions:
i. legal formalism11
II. Property rights institutions:
i. executive constraints
ii. protection against expropriation risk

I. Private credit12
Aghion,
Average growth rate of GDP per capita II. Liquid liabilities13
Howitt&Mayer(1960-1995) relative to the United States III. Bank assets14
Foulkes (2005)
IV. Commercial-central bank15

Alcala&Ciccone
Log GDP per capita (1995)
(2004)

Bockstette,
Chanda&
Putterman
(2002)

I. Log output per worker (1988)
II. Average GDP per capita growth
(1960-1995)

Index of institutional quality16

I. Index of social infrastructure
II. ICRG index

One SD increase in expropriation risk
I. Settler mortality
II. Log of indigenous population (1.47) and legal formalism (1.24, using
"check measure") together increase GDP
density in 1500 7
per capita by 189% (OLS) and 523%
8
III. legal origin
(IV).

I. Legal origin
II. Settler mortality

One SD increase in private credit (0.28)
increases steady-state GDP by 21% in
Belgium2

I. Settler mortality
II. European-language speakers

One SD increase in index of institutional
quality increases GDP per capita by 35%

III.Predicted trade share (AC)12

(IV) (controls include log real openness3)

I. Distance from equator
One SD increase in index of social
II. English speakers
infrastructure (0.25) increases output per
III. European-language speakers
worker by 126% (OLS) and 229% (GMM
IV. Log predicted trade share
IV)
9
V. State antiquity

Article

Key results1

Institutions

Dependent variables
Measure

Instrument

I. Annual per capita GDP growth
(1970-1992)
Clague, Keefer,
II.Output per worker (1988)
Knack&Olson
III. Capital per worker (1988)
(1999)
IV. Years schooling per worker (1985)
V.TFP (1988)

I. Contract-intensive money17
II. ICRG index
III. BERI index

I. Deaths from (i)intestinal infection (ii)
accidental poisoning
II. Quality standards (no. ISO 9000
Djankov, La
certifications)
Porta, Lopez-deIII. Water pollution
Silanes&Shleifer
IV. Unofficial economy:(i) size/ GDP
(ii) employment
V. Product market competition

Number of different procedures that a
start-up has to comply with in order to
No IV estimates.
obtain a legal status, i.e. to start operating
as a legal entity.

Esfahani
&Ramirez
(2003)

I. Growth of GDP per capita
centralization19
II. Growth rates of telephones and power
III. Indices of contract repudiation,
production per capita
bureaucratic quality and corruption 20
IV. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization

Masters
&McMillan
(2001)

Annual average growth rate of TFP
(1965-1990, panel data of 5-year
averages)

Log output per worker (1988)

No IV estimates.

I. Settler mortality
II. Legal origin
III. Log indigenous population
density in 1500

One SD increase in contract-intensive
money (0.14) increases growth by 94.5
(OLS) and 1.739 (IV), controlling for log
GDP per capita in 1970

One SD increase in number of procedures
(4.37) increases deaths from intestinal
infection by 4.588% (OLS), controlling
for log per capita GDP in 1999

One SD increase in contract enforcement
(0.24) increases GDP per capita growth
by 5.8% (OLS) (includes other
institutional quality measures as controls)

One SD increase in constraints
executive (0.185) decreases GDP
capita by 6% (IV), controlling
population in temperate zone (1995)
years of schooling

on
per
for
and

No IV estimates.

One SD increase in democratization
increases annual growth by 2.1% (OLS)
after the deaths of leaders in autocratic
regimes

I. Trust23
II. Civic norms (civic cooperation)

I. Ethnolinguistic homogeneity
II. % Law students 1963

One SD increase in trust (0.14) increases
annual per capita income growth by 1.1%
(OLS) and 1.2% (IV) (includes other
controls)

Index of social infrastructure

I. English speakers
II. European-language speakers
III. Predicted trade shares
IV. Distance from equator
V. State antiquity

One SD increase in index of social
infrastructure (0.25) increases annual
average TFP growth rate by 91.7% (IV),
controlling for initial log TFP

Index of social infrastructure

I. Distance from equator
II. Predicted trade share
III. English speakers
IV. European-language speakers

One SD increase in index of social
infrastructure (0.257) increases output per
worker by 680% (IV) for "tropical"
countries (average frostdays<5 per month
in
winter)

I. Dummy for oil exporter
II. Colonial origins
III. Each measure of democracy
as an instrument for the other

One SD increase in freedom house index
(0.33) increases average dollar wages in
manufacturing by 19.8% (OLS) and
37.62% (IV) (includes controls)

I. Settler mortality
II. European-language speakers
III. Predicted trade shares

One SD increase in rule of law index
(0.94) increases GDP per capita by 112%
(OLS) and 205% (IV), controlling for
distance from equator

Change in annual growth rate of real
GDP per capita comparing 5-year
Index of democratization22
growth averages before and after leader
deaths

I. Average annual growth in per capita
Knack&Keefer
income (1980-1992)
(1997)
II. Investment/GDP (1980-1992)

Kogel (2005)

II. Ethnolinguistic homogeneity11

I. Adverseness of policy environment18
II. Indices of democracy and

I. Log GDP per capita (2000)
Glaeser, La
II. Growth rates of GDP per capita 1960Porta,
2000, overall and by decade
Lopez-deExecutive constraints
III. Years schooling
Silanes&Shleifer
IV. Political institutions
(2004)
(III and IV are 5-year change)

Jones&Olken
(2005)

I. Colonial origin10

I. Political institutions:
i. two rule of law indicators24
Rodrik (1999)

Average dollar wages in manufacturing ii. two democracy indicators25
(1985-1989)
II. Labor market institutions:
i. unionization rate ii. number ILO
workers' rights conventions ratified

Rodrik,
Same as Clague, Keefer, Knack&Olson
Subramanian
(1999), except they use GDP per capita Rule of law index26
&Trebbi (2004) (1995)

Notes on Outcome Variables:
1) Output per worker: Output calculated as GDP minus value added in the mining industry (which includes oil and gas). 2) Urbanization: % population living in urban areas with a population of at least 5,000
in 1995. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 3) Stock market capitalization : Market value of all traded stocks as a % of GDP, average over 1990-95. Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine(2003)

Notes on Institution Measures:
1) Protection against expropriation risk: A measure of risk of expropriation of foreign private investment by government, from 0 to 10, where a higher score indicates less risk. Originally used by Knack and
Keefer (1995). Source: IRIS Center, also known as Political Risk Services
2) Index of social infrastructure: Institutions and government policies that provide incentives for individuals and firms in an economy.
3) Index of government antidiversion policies: Created by averaging five indicators following Knack and Keefer (1995) for 1986–1995. Two categories relate to government’s role in protecting against private
diversion: (i) law and order, and (ii) bureaucratic quality. Three categories relate to government’s possible role as a diverter: (i)corruption, (ii) risk of expropriation, and (iii) government repudiation of
contracts. The index takes values from zero to one (higher is better). Source: Political Risk Services.
4) Index of country's openness: Sachs-Warner index which measures fraction years between 1950 to 1994 that the economy has been open, measured on a 0-1scale. A country is open if it satisfies the
following criteria: (i) nontariff barriers cover less than 40% of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are less than 40%, (iii) any black market premium was less than 20 % during 1970s and 1980s, (iv) country is not
classified as socialist by Kornai (1992), and (v) government does not monopolize major exports. Source: Sachs andWarner (1995).
5)ICRG index: Combines (i) protection against expropriation risk, (ii) rule of law, (iii) repudiation of contracts by government, (iv) corruption in gov't, and (v) quality of bureaucracy. Source: International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, Political Risk Services.
6)BERI index: Combines (i)contract enforceability, (ii) infrastructure quality, (iii) nationalization potential, (iv) bureaucratic delays. (Business Environmental Risk Intelligence).
7) Index of institutional efficiency: Combines nine indices of institutional efficiency: political change, political stability, prob. of opposition group takeover, stability of labor, relationship with neighboring
countries, terrorism, legal system, red tape, and corrupton. Indices are integers between 0-10, higher values indicates that country has "good" institutions. All indices are simple country averages for the period
1980-1983. Source: Business International (BI), now part of Economist Intelligence Unit.
8) Index of bureaucratic efficiency: Combines three indices used for institutional efficiency measure: judiciary system, red tape and corruption indices.
9) Executive constraints : 1-7 category scale, higher score means more constraints on the executive. Equals one if country not independent. (Polity III data set, Gurr (1997))
10) Initial executive constraints: Executive constraints in the first year that country appears in the Gurr's (1997) Polity III data set. Source: Polity III data set, Gurr (1997)
11) Legal formalism: Measures number of formal legal procedures necessary to resolve a simple case of collecting on an unpaid check or evicting a non-paying tenant (from 1 to 7). "Check measure" and
"Eviction measure" from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002, 2003).
12) Private credit: Value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP.
13) Liquid liabilities: Currency plus demand and interestbearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, divided by GDP
14) Bank Assets: Ratio of all credits by banks (but not other financial intermediaries) to GDP
15) Commercial-central bank: Ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets, which has been used by others.
16) Institutional Quality: Combines bureaucratic quality, law/order, and property rights protection indices. (Political Risk Services; similar to Knack-Keefer (1995), Hall- Jones (1999).
17) Contract-intensive money: Ratio of noncurrency money to total money supply. An objective measure of enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights based on the citizens' decisions
regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets.
18) Adverseness of policy environment: Measured by black market premium on the foreign exchange rate. (Barro and Lee (1994)).
19) Index of democracy: Average of 8 indicators ranking policymaker selection process and the constraints on them. Index of centralization: Geographic devolution of state decision-making authority, values of
1 and 3 assigned to federal and unitary systems, respectively, and 2 to intermediate categories. (Polity III data set, Jaggers and Gurr's (1996)).
20) Index of contract repudiation: risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postponement, or scaling down due to budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or
a change in government economic and social policies. Higher scores indicate lower risks. Index of bureaucratic quality: autonomy from political pressure and strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruption in government services as well as the existence of an established mechanism for recruiting and training. Higher scores indicate higher quality.Index of corruption: indicator of
the degree of "improper practices" in the government. The higher the indicator, the lower the degree of corruption.Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, Political Risk Services.
21) Index of institutional quality: Measured by scores for corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy for 1990. Three different measures are scaled from 1 (worst) through 6 (best). They have followed Rodrik
in employing a rescaled unweighted average of the three measures. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, Political Risk Services.
22) Index of democratization: Measured using the "polity" variable in the Polity IV dataset. Autocrats are defined as having a polity score less than or equal to 0. Democrats are those leaders with a polity
score greater than 0.
23) Trust: The question used to assess trust in a society is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Trust indicator used by
the authors is the percentage of respondents in each nation replying “most people can be trusted” (after deleting the “don’t know” responses).
24) These indicators are: (i) ICRG (Knack&Keefer(1995)) (ii) bureaucratic efficiency (Mauro (1995))
25) These indicators are: (i) Freedom House Index (a composite index of democracy for the 1970s, constructed from the indicators of political rights and civil liberties with a scale from 0 to 1 where 1
indicates a fully democratic system) (ii) Polity III (Gurr (1995))
26) Rule of law index: Composite indicator of multiple elements that capture the protection afforded to property rights and the strength of the rule of law. This is a standardized measure with range -2.5
(weakest institutions) and 2.5 (strongest institutions). Approximates for 1990’s institutions. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002)

Notes on Instruments:
1) Settler Mortality: Log estimated mortality for European settlers during European colonization (before 1850). It is calculated from the mortality rates of European-born soldiers, sailors and bishops when
stationed in colonies. It measures the effects of local diseases on people without inherited or acquired immunities. Source: Curtin (1989).
2) Distance from equator: Center of county or province within a country that contains the most people. Source:Global Demography Project, University of California, Santa Barbara.
3) English speakers: Fraction of the population speaking English at birth.
4) European-language speakers: Fraction of the population speaking one of the five principal languages of Europe (English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish) at birth.
5) Predicted trade share: Log value, based on a gravity trade model that only uses a country’s population and geographical features. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999).
6) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization : Measures probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Taylor and Hudson, Worl
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1972
7) Indigenous population density: Population density is calculated as total population divided by land area usable for agriculture. Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978).
8) Legal Origin: Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (French Commercial Code versus English Common Law Origin) Source: La Porta et al (1999).
9) State antiquity: Index for the depth of experience with state-level institutions . Scales from zero to one.
10) Colonial Origin: Dummy variable indicating whether country was a British, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Dutch or Portuguese colony. Source: La Porta et al (1999)
11) Ethnolinguistic homogeneity : Percentage of a country’s population belonging to the largest ethnic group. Each ethnolinguistic group is identified by religion, race, or language depending on which of the
appears to be the most important cleavage in the given community. Source: Sullivan (1991).
12) Predicted trade share (AC): A geography-based instrument for trade. They used exactly the same approach with Frankel and Romer (1999), except that they employ more bilateral trade data than Franke
and Romer (1999).

Notes on Key Results:
1) IV results reported in our table uses all the instruments in 'Instruments for Institutions' column except thoseitalicized. 2) Belgium is the (estimated) converging country with the smallest level of private
credit. 3) Real openness: Log imports plus exports in exchange rate US$ relative to GDP in purchasing-powerparity US$.

Table-2: Institutions and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence
Base Sample
Base Sample
without OECD
without OECD
Base Sample
countries
Base Sample
countries
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares (Dependent Variable: Median Headcount Ratio)
Protection against expropriation risk
(1985-1995)
-9.99
-12.61
-8.65
-11.14
(1.78)
(2.48)
(2.14)
(2.32)
Distance from equator
-7.21
-36.32
(20.16)
(23.38)
Asia dummy
11.82
-14.76
(7.14)
(7.01)
Africa dummy
16.52
17.26
(5.53)
(5.36)
Other continent dummy
13.81
(13.24)

AJR Base Sample
(5)

Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares (Dependent Variable: Median Headcount Ratio)
Protection against expropriation risk
(1985-1995)

-18.30

-19.88

-32.79

-44.82

(3.95)

(7.54)

(18.92)
79.71
(77.87)
14.79
(14.62)
-1.41
(17.68)
64.59
(47.10)

(31.29)
-9.02
(64.68)
26.10
(20.67)
-0.64
(21.31)

Distance from equator
Asia dummy
Africa dummy
Other continent dummy

Panel C: First Stage (Dependent Varibale: Protection Against Expropriation Risk (1985-1995))
Log settler mortality

-0.59
(0.13)

-0.30
(0.13)

-0.27
(0.18)
2.77
(1.42)
0.07
(0.50)
-0.39
(0.44)
1.67
(0.95)

-0.20
(0.17)
0.29
(1.65)
0.28
(0.47)
-0.28
(0.41)

-0.34
(0.18)
2.00
(1.38)
0.46
(0.50)
-0.25
(0.40)
1.04
(0.84)

R2

0.30

0.10

0.42

0.13

0.33

Number of observations

47
1%
0.28

43
25%
5.56

47
50%
18.94

43
75%
36.45

64
99%
87.60

Distance from equator
Asia dummy
Africa dummy
Other continent dummy

Percentiles of median headcount ratio

Notes: The dependent variable is the median headcount index (1981-2001) given by % population living in households with consumption or income per
person below the poverty line, defined as living on $1 a day ($32.74 per month at 1993 PPP), from Povcal Net, World Bank. Protection against
expropriation risk (1985-1995) is the risk of expropriation of private investment by government, scaled from 0 to 10, where a lower score means more risk,
from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Panel A reports OLS estimates. Panel B reports two stage least square estimates, where we instrument for
protection against expropriation risk using log European settler mortality, which is log of estimated mortality for European settlers during the early period
of European colonization (before 1850), from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). In Panel C, we report the corresponding first stage. In columns
(3) and (4) where we include continent dummies as controls, the dummy for America is omitted, following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Our base sample is limited to 47 countries which were excolonies and for which we have headcount, expropriation risk and settler mortality data. To create
the sample, we set the median headcount value to zero for four OECD countries which were excolonies: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and USA
assuming there is no one living under $1 poverty line in these countries. AJR base sample in column (5) refers the largest sample of ex-colonies used by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).

Table-3: Land Rights in Four African Countries
The Gambia

Ivory Coast

Ghana

DRC

Coding of Institutions
Expropriation
Risk

8.27

7.00

6.27

3.50

Legal Origin

English

French

English

French

Urbanization

26%

46%

44%

30%

Overview of
Land Tenure

Urban land legislation only applies to Banjul Land tenure is in a state of confusion. The 1998 Land Tenure derives from tradition and English The 1973 General Property Law makes all land state
and Kombo (St. Mary State Lands Act law 98-750 on Rural Land Tenure initiated a Common Law. Allodial, customary freehold, property. At the local level, customary rules apply
(1990)). Under this, land is state-owned transition to private ownership, but tenure issues common law freehold, leasehold and customary where state power is weak; less than 1% of land in the
except if held in "fee simple" or subject to have become linked with political upheavals since tenancy are recognized. The 1986 Land Titling DRC is registered. In much of the country the
grants. Customary land occupiers hold a 99 the early 1990s. Critically, more than a third of Registration Law applies only in a few urban areas. dominant factor in determining access to land has
year renewable lease. The Lands (Provinces) the population consists of foreigners, and most Most of the country is governed by a mix of been war, which has brought armed occupation and
Act 1946, which recognizes customary law conflict is over the status of both Ivorian and non- customary rules and legislation (e.g. the 1992 population displacement.
holds elsewhere else, and district tribunals Ivorian migrants.
constitution and the 1962 State Lands Act).
may apply Islamic law.

Customary Sector
Extent

99% (i.e.outside Banjul & Kombo)

De jure status

Authority under the Lands (Provinces) Act is Customary tenure has limited legal stature. The Customary law has limited recognition. The 1992 Customary arrangements are not recognized by law.
given to the District Authorities, who are the 1998 land law allows only the state, public Constitution recognizes chiefs' authority over stool
head chiefs (seyfos) under 1990 Laws of the institutions and native Ivorians to own rural land. and skin lands, and of families over family lands.
Gambia. District Tribunals may administer Though intended to create individual tenure, it Several laws, including article the 1992 Constitution
customary and Islamic law, so long as these makes customary rights the basis of claims. (giving Land Commissions a veto over land
are not "repugnant to justice."
Communities registered as village cooperatives or transactions) and the 1994 Office of the
associations have had their rights upheld by the Administrator of Stools Land Act circumscribe
chiefs authority.
courts.

98% of land

80-90% of Ghanaian land

97% of land ( de facto)

De facto status

The state has given customary law legal A “truly muddled and ad hoc system” has Though several attempts have been made by the Elites have used legal uncertainty due to failure of
legitimacy.
resulted from combined assertion of government government to centralize control over land, for the 1973 presidential decree to secure customary tenure to
contol and tolerance of customary systems. most part they defer to customary authorities.
appropriate untitled land. Though required to
Though a 1962 law vests all land in the state, the
advertise lease of ‘vacant’ land, the state has allowed
president refused to enact a 1963 law that
Bamis (local chiefs) to retain their leasing powers in
abolished customary tenure.
return for political support. Local people, through
chiefs and elders, have “de facto veto over the
acquisition process” and “droit de regard” – an
informal management right.

Variation

Gambian customary tenure is complex and There are over 20 ethnic groups. The Agni and There are broad regional differences between the There are over 250 ethnic groups spread across the
diverse; a community may have multiple Baoule in central and eastern provinces are southern coast scrubland, the cocoa-growing central and northern rainforests, the northern and
types of property regimes, and these will matrilineal. The king allocates land to lineages. rainforest of the southern interior, and northern southern savannahs, and the eastern Rift Valley
change over time. Where all parties to a The Agni redistribute land annually, whereas the savannah. Ethnic differences also exist. Among the highlands. Population is concentrated in areas such as
dispute are Muslim, District Tribunals may Baoule keep the same parcels of land over several Ashanti, Dagomba and Gonja, paramount chiefs the Kinshasa region, Banundu, and the Kivus. Other
apply Islamic law. Approximately 90% of the years. Among matrilineal Senoufu, Lobi and have ultimate authority over land. "Traditional" areas are sparsely inhabited. Strictness of a tenure
country is Muslim, and the Mandinka Fula, Koulango, the senior male of the founding lineage tenure systems have survived more in the relatively regime increases with population density (particularly
in Kivu, Bas-Congo, and near cities).
Wolof, Jola and Serahuli account for more allocates land; in patrilineal Malinke the senior land abundant North.
male in the oldest lineage does this.
than 90% of the total population.

The Gambia

Ivory Coast

Ghana

DRC

Land
Ownership

Customary tenure is patrilineal and based on Land may be owned by lineages, families or Individuals, families/ communities represented by Groups or clans own land. A family may “own” land,
original village settlement (unless trumped by individuals. Allocation practices vary, but for the stools and skins, Tendamba (original settlers) and but cannot sell it, since the land “belongs” to the
conquest). The male household head allocates most part land is allocated by a king, lineage clans own customary land. Ideologically, a central government. Where there is a strong
community and its ancestors own the land. Allodial chieftancy (especially in the East), the Mwami (king)
land within the family and mediates land head, or senior male.
title is the highest proprietary interest (analogous to owns the land, and distributes it “through a
disputes. The seyfo (head chief) holds the
freehold interest in English common law). It is sophisticated system of reward and punishment.” This
land in trust for the community. There is
invested in chiefs on behalf of their subjects in stool connects land to political power. Individual families
some confusion about the relative powers of
and skin areas. In some areas tendamba and chiefs may directly control family land, and individuals
seyfos, alkalos (village chiefs), families and
assert competing claims to this title. Whether family often own trees. Customary authorities’ power is
lineages which dates back to at least the early
and stool/skin lands face the same regulations particularly great where rebel authorities are seen as
colonial era.
illegitimate.
remains ambiguous.

Right to
Transfer
Land

Land sales are generally restricted; extended Sales are common, though the seller may retain Land sales are restricted and require chiefs' or elders' Sales of land are generally restricted; customary
families “own” cultivated land (including some use rights and have to approve any resale. permission. Non-transferable allodial title reside in tenure usually involves inalienable group land rights.
fallow land), but cannot alienate it. Founding Local communities have developed their own the community and freeholds cannot be granted A community cannot sell land, but can cede it to other
families have usufruct rights, and can transfer contracts, often recorded in writing as “petits from stool and skin lands. The Lands Commission villages or rent it to strangers. In Masisi, after
land by inheritance, gifts, trades and loans. papiers” and endorsed by several “headmen and must approve land grants to outsiders. Customary promulgation of the 1973 law it became impossible to
Some private property exists in the customary sub-prefects, and even some judges.” The state freehold is secure and transferable, but cannot be buy or sell land without the permission of the Hunde
sector. Trees and wells are usually planters' system is of no use, since ownership can only be acquired by non-Ghanaians. An allodial title holder chiefs; this encouraged clientelism as they profited
private property. Lineage and household established by a certificate that does not yet exist. can sell or gift a common law freehold and grant from selling large parcels.
heads often exercise significant control over Conflicts have erupted between purchasers and leaseholds. Land can be purchased or gifted, but
land transfers. Alienation outside the lineage return migrants who have claimed that the land is community leaders must agree if it is to an outsider.
Leaseholders can grant lesser rights (e.g.abusa and
is usually disallowed (less effective around inalienable.
abunu sharecropping). The land market is informal,
Banjul). Most primary rights transfers are
most transactions are unrecorded, and those
through inheritance.
documented are rarely noted by the state.

Inheritance

“Primary rights,” gained through original In 1964 customary inheritance rules, other than Inheretance rules are matrilineal in Akan-speaking Rules vary between communities; the Kongo are
settlement or direct allocation, include patrilineal systems, were outlawed, but this is not areas and patrilineal in the north, and among the matrilineal, while the Zande Vungara are patrilineal.
permanent occupation, control of land use, usually enforced. Children of immigrants do not Volta and Ga. The matrilineal system is flexible,
and inheritance without interference; this is have established inheritance rights. A tenant who allowing for a variety of possible heirs and ways to
similar to western ownership. Women borrow selects an heir without his tuteur's permission inherit land. Patrilineal areas in the south suffer
land from their husbands to cultivate may lose his rights. Women inherit nothing from from fragmentation into parcels too small to be
vegetables and rice, though some own land husbands but have recently gained the right to economically viable.
hold land given by their fathers. For land pledged
that is passed from mother to daughter.
to a creditor, the creditor's rights are inheritable
for outstanding debt.

The Gambia

Ivory Coast

Ghana

DRC

User Rights

Owners can reclaim borrowed land in land Women can usually only access land through Chiefs can grant lesser interests to members of the Individual rights to the harvest are usually protected.
scarce areas. Use rights (rights to build a their husbands. A mix of contracts exist that can community. These are typically customary freehold, Women may only have access to land through men.
house/other structures, control water, and give owners and non-owners varying cultivation or usufruct, and give member use rights. The interest The Kivus and Ituri were depopulated during the war.
Many squatters arrived from Rwanda and the rest of
plant fruit trees) are more common than to rights; these include tutorat, busan, bugnon, is indefinite so long as the land is not abandoned.
rent or lend out land. Those who sell land troukatalan, rental, surveillance or guardianship,
the DRC, setting up on ranches from 1999-2003.
usually have all other land rights. Primary and pledging.
With the return of the original land-owners, some
right holders can grant “secondary” rights
have been evicted, while others have stayed under the
(usually exclude ability to plant trees).
protection of armed groups.
Pastures, mangroves, streams and most
forests are commons available for hunting
and gathering. Common-property regimes are
frequent, but not open access ones. Alkololu
(local chiefs) and seyfolu (head chiefs) can
determine a tongo – a seasonal prohibition on
activities such as harvesting mangoes.

Right to
Improve
Land

Women and borrowers have fewer land rights Individuals can lose land, but retain ownership The Regional Lands Commission must approve any State policy under Mobutu demanded obligatory
than owners; they cannot plant trees or must over any trees they have planted. In the case of "development or disposition" of stool or skin lands. production of certain crops, contributing to food
receive permission (because these are coffee and cocoa trees, this has been a source of Families are reluctant to tie up capital in orchard insecurity. Often poor land is used for this, causing
associated
with
permanent
rights). conflict.
production; thus, young family members often remit environmental degradation.
Improvement rights are stronger for durable
a portion of their crop to their families in return for
improvements. A long-term borrower
taking land out of general use.
attempts to strengthen his or her rights by
investing in wells, trees or fencing can spark
conflict with the landowner.

Rights of
NonCommunity
Members

Land is often lent, usually on a seasonal basis Relations between indigenous cultivators and Strangers (non-subjects) must obtain the chief's Strangers have insecure tenure, or none at all. In the
but sometimes longer, to settlers from other migrants are the most important aspect of Ivorian permission to reside in an area. After this is granted, some areas of the Kivus, Rwandan Hutu prisoners are
ethnic groups. Payments may be symbolic or tenure. The 1998 law bars non-Ivorians from he acquires land from a landowner or the chief, for used as forced laborers. Congolese have been forced
actual tribute, depending on land scarcity. owning rural land. Non-Ivorian farmers can at example as an "abusa" or "abunu" sharecropper. into camps, while Rwandan settlers are brought in to
Incomers acquire land from chiefs or best hope for a long-term lease from the Abusa has also come to be used by local landless to take their land.
founding families. Secondary rights are certificate-holder or the state. The Houphouët- acquire land. In forest areas, migrants are often in
transferred through borrowing, pledging, Boigny government encouraged migrants, who the majority. Here, chiefs act as landlords. Tenancy
rental, and sharecropping. District tribunal obtained land mainly through “tutorat," whereby is less common in the North, as land is more
members may grant land to newcomers, in one remits a debt of gratitude and continuing abundant, and migrants may obtain land for free.
contravention of Lands (Provinces) Act’s regular payments to a local patron or "tuteur".
vesting of power in District Authorities. Foreigners, especially the Burkinabe, have been
Individuals tend to believe that authorities particularly vulnerable under the 1998 law.
only have this power if they gain lineage
consent.

The Gambia
Ivory Coast
Ghana
DRC
Formal Sector
The State Lands Act, operating only in In 1963 Houphouët-Boigny declared “la terre The 1986 Land Titling Registration Law allows for Individuals can gain land rights through “perpetual”
Individual
Acquisition Banjul and Kombo St. Mary, converts all appartient à celui qui la met en valeur” (the land registration of land, in order to produce secure or “ordinary” concessions from state and must
customary tenure into 99 year leases if the belongs to those who develop it). This has since tenure and reduce fraud in sale. This applies only in improve land during lease. This “mise en valeur”
occupant applies for a title by a specified changed -- in 2001, one minister declared that Accra, Tema, and Kumasi and is generally principle implies a concession can be sold or
deadline; if he does not, he becomes a tenant land belongs to the owner, not the farmer. Under inaccessible to peasants. Squatter rights are not bequeathed, but the state is the proprietor and can
that can be evicted by the state.
the 1998 law, land holders must obtain a land recognized by law. Though public land is officially revoke the concession if the parcel is abandoned, not
certificate within 10 years, and after another 3 available to all Ghanaians, getting a land lease is improved, or transferred without approval. Only a
years individual registration and private property time-consuming and expensive, so political and Congolese can have a perpetual concession. The
concessionaire pays a license fee or rent and
will be enforced. Only 12 hectares can be economic elites have benefitted most.
effectively occupies the land for many years. All
individually owned; the rest comes in a 25 year
children (born in and out of wedlock) must divide
lease from the state, which may be sold,
equally three quarters of the deceased’s estate as
mortgaged, inherited, and renewed. The length
inheritance. Land rights cannot be transmitted
and expense of the process implies most land
through death without a judge's approval.
remains under community-based tenure.

State
Acquisition
and
involvement

The 1994 coup of Yayeh Jammeh mantained The 1998 law vests all unregistered land in the “Public land” categories in Ghana are (i) land The 1973 General Property Law made all lands,
the status quo on tenure issues. All land not state. Though a 1962 law asserted state ownership compulsorily acquired (under the 1962 State Lands including forest resources, state property. Edict 81in freehold in Banjul and Kombo St. Mary is over all land, the government allowed farmers to Act), and (ii) land invested in the president (1962 013 of 1981 and Constitution Article 10 make the
vested in the state, as are resources such as retain land used in production. Government Administration of Lands Act). The State Lands Act under-soil, including mineral and petroleum wealth,
property. The
Mobutu
“kleptocracy”
forests, watercourses and expropriated land attempts to delineate mining, forest and tourist allows the state to acquire any land “in the public state
(State Lands Act, 1990). The Land lands have been ineffective. Politicization of the interest.” Outstanding compensation claims on the encouraged land tenure “informalization” which
Acquisition
Act permits government land question has become part of the larger government are more than $100 million USD, with allowed favored groups and individuals to expropriate
land. The political deadlock between Mobutu and
some claims dating back to the 1970s.
appropriation of land for a broad range of politics of Ivorianness.
parliament in the early 1990s prevented legal redress
“public purposes,” including defense,
to resolve the agricultural crisis or land-related issues.
conservation, and planning.

The Role of N/A
War During
the 1990s

The 1998 law 98750 on Rural Land Tenure has N/A
not been effectively enacted. Article IV of the
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003) reaffirms
this law and charges the Government of National
Reconciliation with implementation. The Accra
III agreement of July 2004 specified changes to
land tenure laws in the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement were to be implemented by August
2004. This deadline was not met.

Land conflict between Hema and Lendu in Ituri has a
long history. ‘Zairianisation’ involved transferring
several foreign concessions to Hema, and conflicts
over these concessions are frequent. Violence since
1999 has displaced half a million people from Ituri,
killed 50,000 and caused the state to lose control of
several areas. Forced migration, crop theft by armed
forces, and short-run gains to mining coltan, gold and
diamonds led many to abandon food production.
Illegal resource exploitation by foreign armed groups
has affected locals' land access.

Sources: Toure, 2003; Knox, 1998; Chavas, Petrie Sources: Chauveau, 2000; Chauveau, 2002; Furth, 1998;
Sources: Toure, 2003; Wily and Hammond, 2001; Kasanga Sources: Huggins et al., 2005; Leisz, 1998; Aide et Action
and Roth, 2005; Freudenberger, 2000. (Urbanization Conte, 2004; Crook, no date; Human Rights Watch, 2004;
and Kosey, 2001; Asiama, 2003; Ministry of Lands and Pour la Paix, 2004; African Development Fund, 2004; Hart and
data from 2005 World Population Data Sheet, Risk Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 2003; USDA Foreign
Forestry, Ghana, 2003; Amanor, 1999; Mahama, 2003, Ducarme, 2005; Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2004; Moyroud and
of Expropriation from Acemoglu, Johnson and Agricultural Service, 2004, Koné, 2002. (Urbanization
Knox, 1998. (Urbanization data from 2005 World Population Katunga, 2002. (Urbanization data from 2005 World
Robinson, 2001, originally from the IRIS-3 dataset, data from 2005 World Population Data Sheet, Risk of
Data Sheet, Risk of Expropriation from Acemoglu, Johnson Population Data Sheet, Risk of Expropriation from Acemoglu,
legal origin from The International Institute for Expropriation from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
and Robinson, 2001, originally from the IRIS-3 dataset, and Johnson and Robinson, 2001, originally from the IRIS-3
Corporate Governance at the Yale School of 2001, originally from the IRIS-3 dataset, and legal origin
legal origin from The International Institute for Corporate dataset, and legal origin from The International Institute for
Management, and ethnic and religious data from the from The International Institute for Corporate Governance
Governance at the Yale School of Management)
Corporate Governance at the Yale School of Management)
CIA World Factbook)
at the Yale School of Management)

TABLE-4: Institutions and Development: Within Country Evidence
Institutions in Crosscountry literature
Protection against
expropriation risk; Index
of Government
Antidiversion policies;
ICRG Index

Country
Indonesia

Within Country Counterpart
Institution Measure (Paper)
Political Connections (Fisman)

China (importer) Evasion Gap: Difference between reported
Hongkong
exports to a country and imports reported by
(exporter)
receiving country (Fisman and Wei)
India

Tariff changes (Topalova)

Colombia
Brazil

Tariff changes (Pavcnik and Goldberg)

Index of country openness

Intellectual Property
Rights

India

Legal Formalism; Contract
India
Repudiation

Fisman exploits differences in share price reactions to
news about former President Suharto's health of firms
with varying degrees of political exposure to show that
political connections can account for upto a quarter of a
firm’s share price.
Topalova uses variations in exposure of Indian districts
to trade liberalization to show that districts whcih
witnessed the largest reductions in trade protectionism
saw the least fall in poverty.

Assessment of patent protection (Chaudhuri,
Goldberg and Jia)

Without price regulation or compulsory licensing, total
annual welfare losses to the Indian economy from
withdrawal of 4 domestic product groups in the
fluoroquinolone sub-segment would be about 118% of
the entire sales of the systemic anti-bacterials segment of
pharmaceuticals in 2000.

Debt Relief Tribunal (Visaria)
State court efficiency (Chemin)

Visaria exploits variation in spread of debt tribunals, and
in which firms were affected by it, to shows that tribunal
establishment reduced loan repayment delinquency in
loan by 3-10 percent.

Argentina

Privatization of water services
(Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky)

China

Community Public Firm (Jin and Qian)

Mexico

Savings institution (Aportela)

India

Rural bank branch expansion (Burgess and
Pande)
Change in eligibility for formal sector loan
(Banerjee and Duflo)
Financial development (Bell and Rousseau)

South Korea

Financial restraints (Demetriades and Luintel)

Privatization

Financial Intermediation

Findings -- an illustration

Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky exploit time-series
variation in the privatization of water servies across
Argentinian municipalities to show that water
privatization improved access, expanded service, and
reduced child mortality.
Burgess and Pande exploit the introduction and
subsequent removal of a branch licensing program in
India which constrained branch openings in already
banked areas and increased branch opening in rural
unbanked areas to show that rural branch expansion
significantly lowered rural poverty, and increased nonagricultural output.

Labor Market Institutions India

Labor Regulation (Besley and Burgess)

Regulating labor market in a pro-worker direction lower
investment, employment, productivity and output in
registered manufacturing. Pro-worker amendments to the
Industrial Disputes Act increase urban poverty.

Ethnolonguistic
Fractionalization

Kenya

Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (Miguel and
Gugerty)

Variation in ethnic diversity across schools is used to
show that such diversity lowers primary school funding
and worsens school facilities.

India

Political representation and decentralization
(Foster and Rosenzweig, Bardhan and
Mookherjee, Pande, Chattopadhyay and Duflo,
Besley, Pande and Rao and Faguet)

Pande exploits quasi-random variation in mandated
political representation for disadvantaged groups to show
that it increased targeted redistribution towards these
groups.

Ghana

Kinship patterns (La Ferrara)

Taiwan

ROSCAs (Kan)

La Ferrara shows that about 67 percent of the total
amount borrowed is borrowed from potential kinsmen,
and suggests this is as membership in a dynastically
linked community shapes individual incentives in
economic transactions .

Democratization

Trust

Land Rights

See Table 4

Table-5: Impact of Land-titling and Registration Programs: Micro Evidence
Country (Paper)

Outcome

Data Set

Policy

Findings

Empirical strategies used in the papers are n the notes below.
PANEL A: AFRICA
Year: Not given
GHANA
Besley(1995)

i. Land Rights
ii. Productivity

Region: Wassa and
Anloga
Unit: 334 households
with 1568 fields

None

Year: 1987-1988
GHANA,
RWANDA AND
KENYA
Migot-Adholla et
al. (1991)
Place and Hazell
(1993)

i. Credit Use
ii. Inputs
iii. Investment
iv. Yields

Region: 10 rainfed
agriculture regions

Unit: Farm surveys

Year: 1988
KENYA
Migot-Adholla,
Place and OluochKosura (1994)
(hereafter MPO)
Place and MigotAdholla 1998)
(hereafter PM)

i. Investment
ii. Output
Region: Nyeri and
iii. Determinants Kakamega
of Title
iv. Access to
Credit
Unit: 406 households
with 463 parcels

Year: Not given
KENYA
Cartier, Wiebe and i. Input Use
ii. Output
Blarel (1994)

Region: Njoro division
Unit: 109 households
(plot-level data)

KENYA &
TANZANIA
Pinckney and
Kimuyu (1994)

SENEGAL
Golan (1994)

None

i. Access to
Credit
ii. Investment
iii.Land Market
iv. Inequality

i. Investment
ii. Credit Access

Year: 1991-1992
Region: Murang'a
(Kenya) and Moshi
(Tanzania)
Unit: 230 households
Year: 1987
Region: The "Peanut
Basin"
Unit: 48 compounds
holding 351 parcels

No clear relationship between land registration and
productivity (Migot-Adholla et al (1991)). Place and Hazell
(1993) focus on land rights. Effects of land rights on credit
are mixed; in one village, they increase moneylender
borrowing; in another they decrease borrowing for food
consumption. Land rights did not significantly affect input
use. Strongest positive relationship between land rights and
investment was for long-term investments in Rwanda;
elsewhere mixed results. No significant relationship
between land rights and yield.

Land title and land rights have limited effect on farm
investments, and none on yield (MPO). Rights tend to be
"more comprehensive" on titled and registered parcels, but
Registered Land Act
many cannot be sold or mortgaged (because (i) famers with
(1963): individualizes land
secure tenure do not obtain titles, and (ii) indigenous
rights while giving land
tenure systems). Registered parcels are slightly more
committees considerable
subject to litigation. Title does not affect credit use, but
control over land
titles owned by close relatives and access to credit are
transactions.
weakly positively correlated. Male household heads and a
lack of previous subdivision increases title and registration.
Predicted title has no effect on yield (PM).
i. Squatter Settlement
Scheme: opened forest
reserve to settlement,
redistributed ex-European
land.
ii. Fourth Development
Plan (1979-1983):
approved de facto
subdivisions of land.

"Untitled" farms produce 20% less than titled ones. Titled
farms are more productive but note this may be due to
correlation between titling and farmer/farm characteristics.
In fixed effect regressions, mixed results for output with no
evidence of security-induced demand for inputs.

No land-secured loans in Tanzania and only two in Kenya,
Land registration in Kenya, so titling has not increased credit use. There is more
abolition of private title in investment in Kenya, but this is due to cash-crop policy,
not titling. Differences in inequality are due to differing
Tanzania.
practices of land partition at inheritance, not land policies.
i. 1906 Regime
d'immatriculation: allowed Very few original registered titles, and these were owned
some to apply for
by the elite. No surviving investments on titled land but
registration.
title is used to obtain credit. Areas more affected by the
ii. Law of National Domain Law of National Domain have greater tenure insecurity. No
1964: stopped new
link between tenure security and farm investments.
registrations.

Year: 1987-1989
Agricultural Land Law
i. Perceived
Region: Kigezi District (1975): sets out registration
Benefits
procedures; individuals can
SOMALIA
ii. Land Value
apply at the local district
Unit:
148
registered
and
Roth, Unruh, and iii. Tenure
level, though officials are
unregistered
Barrows (1994) Security
sometimes instructed to
iv. Credit Access smallholders and
find unregistered land for
registered
largeholders
v. Investment
"outsiders."
with 226 parcels
(Stratified sample)

Having a deed has a significant positive effect on land
rights that require approval in Wassa. In Anloga, the
correlation is negative, suggesting lineage sanctions and
title are substitutes. Land rights increase productivity.

Registered and unregistered farmers perceive registration
increases tenure security, the propensity to sell or lease
land, access to credit, and investment. The marginal effect
of registration on land value is 44 300-57 300 SSh. Title
has an overall negative but insignificant effect on
perceived tenure security (significant for small-holders
with high quality land). The link between title and access
to credit is positive but insignificant, except for large
landowners, for whom registration brings access to formal
credit.

Country (Paper)

Outcomes of
Interest

Data Set

Policy

Findings

Rujumbura Pilot Land
Registration Scheme
(1958)

Households compelled to register their parcels receive less
cash income and remittances, and are significant coffee
producers. Those with voluntarily registered parcels own
more productive capital. Dispute incidence is lower for
registered land. Registration significantly increases farm
investments, with the effect more widespread for voluntary
(relative to compulsory) registration.

Year: 1987
UGANDA
i. Investment
Roth, Cochrane
ii. Perceived
and KisambaBenefits
Mugerwa (1994)

Region: Kigezi District
Unit: 228 households
with 505 parcels

PANEL B: ASIA
Year: 1979-1993
INDIA
Banerjee, Gertler i. Productivity
and Ghatak (2002)

Region: West Bengal
and Bangladesh
Unit: District

Relative to Bangladesh, the program raised sharecropper
Operation Barga (1977),
productivity in W.Bengal by 51%. Fixed-effects estimate
which gave tenure security
suggests the program boosted sharecropper productivity by
to registered sharecroppers
62 %.

Year: 1993
INDIA
i. Credit Use
Pender and Kerr ii. Investment
(1999)
iii. Land Use

No specific policy; most
Region: Aurepalle and land is held in formal title,
Dokur, Andhra Pradesh "assigned" land has been
granted to poorer residents
Unit: Survey of 291
who receive nonhouseholds with 563
transferable usufruct rights.
plots.
Year: 1983

THE PHILLIPINES
Friedman, Jimenez Land Value
and Mayo (1993)

Region: Manila

None

Unit: 1688 households

Year: 1987
THAILAND
i. Investment
Feder and Onchan
ii. Credit Access
(1987)

THAILAND
Pagiola (1999)

Land Code (1954), which
created both title deeds and
Region: Lop-Buri,
utilization certificates for
Nakhon Ratchasima, and
private land.
Khon-Kaen Provinces
Unit: 48 compounds

Year: 1991/92 and
1995/96
i. Program
Land Titling Project, Phase
Benefits
2, 1991-1994
ii. Rate of Return Region: National
iii. Credit Access
Unit: Household survey
Year: 1992-1993 and
1997-1998

i. Investment
Region: Not available.
VIETNAM
ii. Productivity
Do and Iyer (2003) iii. Credit Access Unit: panel of 4000+
iv. Land Transfers households. Provincelevel data on LUC
issuance in 1994, 1998
and 2000.

Land Law (1993), which
allows for transferable
leases from the state
implemented using Land
Use Certificates (LUCs).

Assigned land has a negative effect on supply and demand
for moneylender and institutional credit. Adult males
increase investment on assigned plots but decrease it on
titled plots. Effect of household characteristics on
investment is greater on titled plots. Share of land subject
to sales restrictions has no effect on decision to cultivate in
Aurepalle, and a negative effect in Dokur.
Formal sector units are worth more than squatter units, and
this difference shrinks with age of squatter unit. Concrete
foundations, several stories or locating in richer area
signals low eviction risk, even in absence of title. A tenyear old residence sells for 25% more if it were in the
formal sector.
Titles increase capital accumulation, except in Lop-Buri,
where there is an ample non-institutional credit, more
commercialization, and lower-risk cash cropping.
Investment in bunding of land and clearing of stumps are
positively affected by land title, but effects are
insignificant in Lop-Buri.
Credit use increased faster in provinces where the program
was implemented. This increase was greatest in provinces
that were poorest at the outset. Results for productivity
were too sensitive to model specification to be useful.
Anecdotal information suggests titles increase land values.
The estimated rate of return from the program is 34%.

Titled households increase proportion of multi-year crops
by 7.5% relative to untitled farms, at the expense of
annuals. Titled households increase irrigated area by 20%
and labor inputs by 4.5 weeks. Impact of title on credit
access is insignificant, but it does have a positive effect on
land transfers.

Outcomes of
Interest
PANEL C: LATIN AMERICA

Country (Paper)

Data Set

Year: 1991-1994
(Conflict), 1985 (Census
BRAZIL
Alston, Libecap, i. Violent Conflict Data)
and Mueller (2000)
Region: Para
Unit: 105 Municipos
BRAZIL
Alston, Libecap,
and Schneider
(1996)

HONDURAS
Lopez (1996)

i. Program Rate of Year: Not given
Return
Region: Peten
i. Productivity
ii. Investment
iii. Access to
Credit

Year: 1983-1994
Region: Santa Barbara
and Comayogua
Unit: 450 farm
households
Year: 1996 and 1999

NICARAGUA
i. Investment
Deninger and
ii. Land Value
Chamorro (2003)

Region: National
Unit: 2476 households
(3212 plots)

NICARAGUA
Broegaard et al.
(2002)

Findings

Formal Settlement
Programs organized by the
government agency
INCRA

Squatting, forest clearing and large farms weaken property
rights, contributing to violent conflict. Value is
significantly related to conflict, and "higher land values
encourage invasions and evictions."

Year: 1940-1970 (Para)
i. Supply and
and 1870-1985 (Parana) No specific policy; titling
Demand for Title
is administered by state
ii. Land Value
governments.
Region:
Para
and
Parana
iii. Investment

Unit: 206 households
Year: 1996
i. Land Value
EQUADOR
ii. Perceptions of Region: Guayaquil
Lanjouw and Levy Tenure Security
Unit: 400 households
(2002)
iii. Ability to
(1921 individuals)
Transfer Land
GUATEMALA
Pagiola (1999)

Policy

Year: Not given
i. Land Title
Registration
Region: National
ii. Perceived
Tenure Insecurity
iii. Land Use
iv. Land Values
Unit: 921 households
v. Credit Access
with 975 plots of land
vi. Agricultural
Production

Year: 1996 and 1999
i. Investment
NICARAGUA de ii. Determinants Region: National
Laiglasia (2004) of Registration
Unit: 2476 households
iii. Credit Access
(3212 plots)
Year: 1987
PARAGUAY
i. Investment
Carter and Olinto
ii. Credit Access
(2000)

PERU
Antle, Yanggen,
Investment
Valdivia, and
Crissman (2003)

Region: Paraguari, San
Pedro and Itapua
Unit: 48 compounds
holding 351 parcels
Year: 1997-1999
Region: Cajamarca
Unit: 847 parcels

Title has a positive and significant effect on land value,
independent from its impact on investment, which
decreases with distance. The increase in land value
predicted by the value regressions has a positive but less
significant impact on title acquisition. Title increases
investment.

1992 Titling project
Title increases perceived market value of property by
initiated by Municipality of
23.5%.
Guayaquil

Land Administration
Project

The estimated rate of return is 12.3%, and the profitability
of the program is robust to several changes in assumptions.

Average investment for USAID-funded farmers was twice
that of others. A greater proportion of these farmers
Project funded by USAID, received credit, and in larger amounts. The difference in
initiated in 1983.
yields between the two groups was statistically significant
in 1993 but not 1983. Rate of return to the titling project
was 17%.
Programa Nacional de
Catastro, Titulacion y
Registro, since 1992,
which encourages titling
and registration.

Full registration increases investment; title without
registration has only an insignificant impact. Registration
affects plot-level, not household-level, investment,
suggesting access to credit is unaffected. Registration
increases land values by 30% (same effect as 20 years of
continuous possession).

Complete formal documents improve tenure security.
Formal title deeds increase probability of public
registration and permanent crop cultivation, and reduce
1997 legislation
sanctioning ownership by perceived future tenure conflict. Formal title has a small
beneficiaries of Sandinista positive effect on land value and none on credit. Landreform documents increase registration and tenure security,
redistribution
but effects are smaller than the impacts of formal title.
Further, they do not affect permanent crop cultivation.

Programa Nacional de
Catastro, Titulacion y
Registro, since 1992,
which encourages titling
and registration.

Land registration increases the probability of land-attached
investment by 35% -- the specific type of title (excluding
indigenous forms) is unimportant. No link between credit
and land registration.

Legal security improves attached capital and has a
negative impact on movable capital. Positive impact of title
No General Progam: Land
on investment weaker for liquidity-constrained farms, and
can be either "Titled" or
reductions in movable capital are not offset by increases in
"Formal" but untitled.
attached capital for small farms. Below 3 hectares no effect
on credit rationing probability.
Proyecto Especial de
Titulacion des Tierras
(Special Land Titling
Project), encourages
farmers to obtain titles.

Accounting for endogenous titling, titling increases the
mean probability of terracing from 25.8% to 32.4%.

Country (Paper)

Outcomes of
Interest

Data Set

Policy

i. Committee for the
Year: March 2000
(middle of the program) Formalization of Private
Property
PERU
i. Labor Supply
ii. Decree 424: Law for
Field (2003)
(Field)
Formalization of Informal
Field and Torero ii. Credit Access Region:Urban
Properties (1996): From
(2004)
(Field and Torero)
1992 to 1997 over 1.2
million urban households
given formal property
Unit: 2750 households titles.

Findings

Untitled households work 17% less hours than those with
titles and are 47% more likely to work inside the home.
Titled households are 28% less likely to engage in child
labor (Field). Untitled households are 10% less likely to be
approved for formal sector loans. Titling does not affect
private sector approval rates, but lowers the interest rate by
9% (Field and Torrero).

Notes on empirical strategies used in above papers:
Alston, Libecap, and
Mueller (2000)

Conflict incidence estimated as a function of settlements, squatting, forest clearing, farm size, value, and number of establishments.
Instrument for settlements are federal versus provincial jurisdiction, distance from state capital, and area of projects receiving
institutional credit.

Alston, Libecap, and
Schneider (1996)

Census ans survey data for land value and investment, survey data for determinants of land titling, land value and investment.
Expected change in value and landholder characteristics are used as instruments for title.

Antle, Yanggen,
Valdivia, and
Crissman (2003)

Impact on terracing on title with farm size and years of ownership as instruments for obtaining land title.

Banerjee, Gertler and Difference-in-differences comparisons of yield per acre using district panel data with West Bengal as treatment and Bangladesh as a
Ghatak (2002)
control group. Exploit over time variation in sharecropper registration rates in West Bengal for fixed effects model.
Besley (1995)

Effect of transfer rights on productivity using title deed as instrument for transfer rights.

Broegaard et al,
(2002)

Titles are instrumented using wealth and education.

Carter and Olinto
(2000)

Simulated maximum likelihood to separate liquidity constrainted and unconstrained households. Impact of title status on attached
and unattached capital estimated using OLS first-differences.

Cartier, Wiebe and
Blarel (1994)

Compare farms with and without titles. Plot level regression with farm fixed effects for 26 farms with plots under a variety of
arrangements.

de Laiglesia (2004)

Investment from 1996 to 1999 as a function of tenure status. Household fixed effects are used to deal with unobserved heterogenity,
and endogeneity is controlled for by repeating the regression only for households participating in legalization and by instrumenting
registration with documents held.

Deninger and
Chamorro (2003)

Probit for the effect of title on investment occuring and tobit for the amount of investment. The impact on land values uses
household fixed effects.

Do and Iyer (2003)

Differences-in-differences approach, with provincial LUC rates are used to measure the probability that a household benefitted.
Registration rates do not appear endogenous.

Dowall and Leaf
(1991)
Feder and Onchan
(1987)

Simple regressions, not controlling for endogeneity, and comparison of average land prices.
Regressions of capital stock on titles, with father's landholdings instrumenting for quality-adjusted amount of land. Logit estimates
for the adoption of land improvements, without instrumentation.

Field (2003), Field and Uses differences across regions induced by the timing of the program, and differences across target populations in the level of preTorero (2004)
program tenure security.
Friedman, Jimenez and
Logit estimations of determinants of squatting. Hedonic regressions of dwelling value.
Mayo (1993)
Golan (1994)

Compare survey data from two villages differentially affected by the law of National Domain. (no regressions).

Lanjouw and Levy
(2002)

Linear regression where dependent variable was what the respondent thought would be the change in land value if he or she were to
gain or lose title.

Lopez (1996)

In addition to comparing descriptive statistics, factors that were statistically similar between USAID and non-USAID farmers in
1983 and dissimilar in 1993 were identified. Yield was insignificantly different in 1983, but significantly different in 1993.

Notes on empirical strategies used in above papers:
Migot-Adholla et al
Details are not available (table information is based on a description in Feder and Nishio (1998)).
(1991)
Migot-Adholla, Place
Estimate effect of title on (i) fourteen types of farm investment (ii) yield
and Oluoch-Kosura
(1994)
Pagiola (1999)

For Thailand, he takes results from other studies about the benefits of land titling in Thailand before producing a cost-benefit
analysis, while for Guatemala he uses observed willingness to pay to measure benefits.

Pender and Kerr
(1993)

Maximum likelihood switching regressions are used to separate the effects of title on credit demand and supply. Because of the
simultaneous occurance of land use and investment, and possible dependence on previous investment a "simultaneous tobit-probit"
model was created for this paper.

Pinckney and Kimuyu
Comparison of two samples (no regressions).
(1994)
Place and Hazell
(1993)

Household fixed effects are used to deal with unobservables, but no instruments are available to tackle endogeneity.

Place and MigotAdholla (1998)

Comparison of descriptive statistics. Predicted title is used as an explanatory variable in the credit and investment equations; due to
lack of variation in predicted title, error-components GLS was used.

Roth, Cochrane and
Kisamba-Mugerwa
(1994)

Estimate effect of registration on six types of investment.

Roth, Unruh, and
Barrows (1994)

Regressions with land value and investment demand as outcomes. Do not account for endogenous registeration.

Table-6: Perceptions of Land Rights
Percent of Cultivated Plots on which Respondent Claims
Right to:
Determine
Rent Out
Lend Out
Sell
Inheritance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Non-office holders

6

22

32

15

Office holders

26

53

60

32

t-test for equality

6.41

6.74

5.83

4.34

Number of observations
Notes:

575

576

576

575

Table-7: Fallow Duration, Profits, and Political Office
Fallow
Fallow
Plot Profit
Duration
Duration
(Years) (1000 cedis) (Years)
OLS

IV

OLS

(1)

(2)

(3)

Fallow duration
Female
1 if resp. holds trad. office

-0.430
(0.54)
1.950
(0.80)

Commercially-obtained plot
Office*Commercially-obtained
1 if first of family in town
Years family/resp lived in village
Number of wives of father
Number of father's children
Parity of mother in father's wives
1 if fostered as child
Size of inherited land
1 if mother had any education
1 if father had any education

314
(182)
143
(426)

-0.921
(0.36)
3.085
(0.64)
0.633
(0.34)
-0.407
(0.78)

Fallow
Duration
(Years)
Individual
F.E.
(4)

0.698
(0.24)

0.290
(0.64)
0.010
(0.01)
0.520
(0.23)
-0.020
(0.05)
-0.420
(0.36)
0.350
(0.61)
-0.520
(0.57)
0.960
(1.05)
-0.980
(0.63)

Notes: All regressions include plot controls (deciles of area, indicators of soil type,
toposequence, and location), full set of plot characteristics, full set of family
background variables, household and spatial fixed effects. All regressions also include
spatial fixed effects, with radius of 250 meters. Standard errors,corrected for spatial
correlations as in Conley (1999), are given in parentheses.

Table-8: Fallowing, Networks and Abusua Resources
(1)
Last Fallow Duration
Parameter Estimate
Female
0.12
(0.45)
Office
2.67
(0.45)
Talk Frequently w/Office Holder
2.05
(0.53)
Households in Abusua/ha

(2)
Last Fallow Duration
Parameter Estimate
-0.66
(0.35)
3.88
(0.63)

(3)
Last Fallow Duration
Parameter Estimate
-0.69
(0.60)
-2.44
(2.21)

-0.23
(0.05)

-0.63
(0.58)
3.38
(1.37)

368

368

Office*Households in Abusua/ha

Number of observations

323

Quintiles of Population Density
25%
Households in Abusua/ha
1.08
Notes: All specifications include full set of plot characteristics, full set of
fixed effects. All regressions also include spatial fixed effects, with radius
spatial correlations as in Conley (1999), are given in parentheses.

50%
75%
1.91
2.60
family background variables, and household
of 250 meters. Standard errors,corrected for

Table-9: Abusua Land and Leadership Characteristics
Area
Assets
Cultivated
(Thousand
(Hectares)
Cedis)
(1)
(2)

Went to
School

PCE

Household
Size

Number of
Adults

(3)

(4)

(5)

(Thousand
Cedis)
(6)

(1=yes)

PANEL A: Sample of Office Holders
Abusua land per Household

Number of observations

405
(1163)

4.703
(1.197)

2.992
(0.516)

2.134
(0.413)

0.350
(0.175)

9
(42)

50

32

43

43

43

36

PANEL B: Sample of All Cultivators
Office

582
(939)

-1.468
(0.866)

0.546
(0.589)

-0.184
(0.665)

-0.410
(0.119)

-53
(37)

Abusua land per household

137
(197)

0.957
(0.416)

1.715
(0.976)

0.336
(0.448)

-0.272
(0.092)

-56
(20)

268
(1165)

3.745
(1.375)

0.875
(1.008)

1.899
(0.803)

0.622
(0.156)

80
(42)

191
cultivators

153
households

153
households

303
individuals

274
households

Office * Abusua land per
household

Number of observations

325
individuals
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Table-10: Responses to Land Scarcity
Nonfarm
Activity
(Hours/Day)
(1)

Office
Abusua land per household
Office * Abusua land per household

-4.169
(1.078)
-2.415
(0.978)
5.534
(1.418)

Cultivation of
CommerciallyObtained Plots
(% of total cultivated
area)
(2)

-0.219
(0.143)
-0.392
(0.122)
0.489
(0.319)

Number of observations
325
222
Notes: All specifications include full set of plot characteristics, full set of
family background variables, and household fixed effects. All regressions also
include spatial fixed effects, with radius of 250 meters. Standard
errors,corrected for spatial correlations as in Conley (1999), are given in
parentheses.

